

JPRS 74064

23 August 1979

West Europe Report

No. 1460

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74064	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle WEST EUROPE REPORT, No. 1460			5. Report Date 23 August 1979	
7. Author(s)			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
			11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above			13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
			14.	
15. Supplementary Notes				
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) This serial report contains political/economic information on West European energy, finance and trade policy matters as well as developments and trends in the doctrine, programs and problems of the major communist parties, including their relations with communist parties outside the West European area. The report also contains information on Theater Nuclear Forces and elections to the European Parliament.				
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors				
Political Science	International Affairs	Iceland		
Sociology	Austria	Italy		
Propaganda	Belgium	Luxembourg		
Economics	Canada	Netherlands		
Energy	Cyprus	Norway		
Industry	Denmark	X Portugal		
Trade	X Federal Republic of	X Spain		
Finance	Germany	Sweden		
Theater Nuclear Forces	Finland	Switzerland		
	X France	Turkey		
	Greece	United Kingdom		
b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms				
c. COSATI Field/Group 5C, 5D, 10				
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED		21. No. of Pages 62
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED		22. Price

23 August 1979

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1460

CONTENTS

PAGE

COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Results of Poll on Strauss Candidacy Reported (DER SPIEGEL, 9 Jul 79)	1
Strauss Gives Views on Election Campaign (Friedrich Karl Fromme; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 17 Jul 79)	11
Baum Interviewed on FDP Election Prospects (Gerhart Baum Interview; DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 27 Jul 79).	15

FRANCE

Analysis of French Government's Approach to Disarmament (Jean Klein; POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 2, 1979)	20
Analysis of French Role in Future SALT Talks (Pierre Lallouche; POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 2, 1979) ..	37
Briefs Military Maneuvers	43

PORTUGAL

Azores' Mota Amaral on Region's Future Development (Mota Amaral Interview; DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 17 Jul 79)	44
--	----

SPAIN

Commentary Scores Basque Statute for Inaccurate Language (Jose Antonio Davila y Garcia-Miranda; ABC, 22 Jul 79)	55
Canary Archipelago Leader on Progress Towards Autonomy (Fernando Bergasa Interview; EL PAIS, 17 Jul 79)	58

RESULTS OF POLL ON STRAUSS CANDIDACY REPORTED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 9 Jul 79 pp 25-28

[Report on SPIEGEL poll about the situation following the nomination of the CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor: "A New Chance of Success With Strauss?"]

[Text] The nomination of Franz Josef Strauss has caused a change in views among CDU/CSU voters. Many supporters of Ernst Albrecht of Lower Saxony now say the Bavarian is the more suitable candidate. This is shown in an EMNID poll commissioned by DER SPIEGEL which last week looked into the political situation following the decision in favor of Strauss. Conversely, among decisive electoral groups, such as workers and young voters, the aversion against the CDU and CSU is increasing. The polarization for and against Strauss appears to benefit the FDP.

Among every 100 German voters, 13 are resolved to change the party of their choice because Franz Josef Strauss has become the CDU/CSU candidate for chancellor.

Seldom in the history of the Federal Republic can there have been an event which has changed the political position of so many citizens.

Four out of every 100 Germans say that while they normally "would not vote for the CDU/CSU, this party now would be a possible choice" for them "since Strauss is the candidate for chancellor."

Conversely, however, 9 out of 100--in other words, twice as many, state: "Normally I would vote for the CDU/CSU, but with Strauss as the candidate for chancellor, this party is not really a possibility as far as I am concerned."

A gain of 4 percent and a loss of 9 percent for the CDU/CSU because of Strauss--those are the results of a poll by the EMNID Institute of Bielefeld

which, on behalf of DER SPIEGEL, last week looked into public opinion about the situation following the nomination of the Bavarian as candidate for chancellor.

It was the first analysis since the Bundestag fraction of the CDU and CSU decided in favor of Strauss and against Ernst Albrecht of Lower Saxony. A telephone poll last Tuesday [3 July] on behalf of the MONITOR television magazine was limited to 200 CDU/CSU voters each in Bavaria and the Federal Republic and, besides, only to a couple of questions.

On behalf of DER SPIEGEL, EMID dispatched 201 interviewers on Wednesday and Thursday with detailed questionnaires into the homes of 1,000 men and women. Their replies are representative of all voters of the Federal Republic. (See tables)*

Strauss as a candidate for the most important public office—that is an issue for almost all Germans. Of 100 persons asked, 95 stated 2 or 3 days after the decision had been made that they had "heard or read about it." And, in contrast with other political polls, only very few (1 or 2 percent) did not want or were unable to reply. Generally the silent minority is larger.

Two questions by EMNID were supposed to establish whether, in the opinion of the voters, the CDU/CSU had increased their chances by opting for Strauss.

The first question concerned the two politicians who until last Monday had been the rival candidates within the CDU/CSU. The result testifies against Strauss and for Albrecht.

Only 31 out of 100 Germans are of the opinion that in the election year of 1980 the CDU/CSU will have a greater chance to succeed with Strauss than with Albrecht. Conversely, 40 out of 100 think that with Albrecht as the candidate the Bonn opposition would have had better prospects.

The second question has long since been part of the repertory of all institutes, but now for the first time Franz Josef Strauss takes the place of Helmut Kohl:

"Who do you think will win the Bundestag elections in 1980--the SPD and FDP with the current federal chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, or the CDU/CSU with Franz Josef Strauss as candidate for chancellor?"

Only 1 in 3 (36 percent) of the persons asked believe that Strauss will defeat Schmidt, while 62 percent are convinced that Schmidt will continue in office after the 1980 elections.

*If in the text of this article or in the tables the figures do not add up to 100 percent, it is because the answer "other" and different answers are not shown.

A comparison with other polls of this year shows only slight changes in the figures for Schmidt and the SPD/FDP. At an INFRATEST poll on behalf of DER SPIEGEL in February/March 1979 the total was 58 percent, in an EMNID poll in March it was 68.

While Strauss attained higher figures than Kohl, whom only about 25 percent of the voters gave a chance to win in the last few months, this gain is due less to the identity of the new candidate than to the end of the dispute within the CDU/CSU. Any other candidate also would have obtained more than Kohl's miserable 23 or 25 percent.

But, above all, whether it is 25 percent or 36 percent, neither one nor the other figure qualifies one as a potential winner.

Whereas in the above question the persons polled were to judge the chances of victory regardless of their particular political attitude (as far as possible), another question was addressed explicitly to their "personal opinion"--namely, as to whether in a direct vote they would vote for Schmidt or for Strauss as chancellor.

Here too the result was almost a two-thirds majority for Schmidt, and again Strauss was able to garner barely more than one-third (59 versus 38 percent).

In the 1976 election year the distance between Kohl and Schmidt at times was small, with the opposition candidate occasionally lagging by only 5 percent. In the course of 1977 and 1978 the distance increased, in the end to 37 percent. (In June 1979 INFAS [Institute for Applied Science] reported 60 percent for Schmidt and 23 percent for Kohl.)

Here too the score of Schmidt is almost the same after the change in candidates of the opposition, while Strauss does come off 15 percent better than Kohl. But again the gain can be traced primarily to the fact that many voters, previously confused by the CDU/CSU quarrels and for a long time inclined to support someone else or unwilling to make a choice, are now betting on Strauss.

If the results of the EMNID poll are analyzed according to party preference, it is shown throughout that the Strauss candidacy is polarizing the opinions of the voters.

Many voters of Kohl's and Albrecht's CDU--"with a rapidity bound to amaze even experts," according to EMNID pollster Klaus-Peter Schoeppner--have switched to the new strong man at the top.

Here are the figures on this switch: As late as middle of June, in a poll by the Mannheim Election Research Group on behalf of ZDF [Second German Television Program], only 33 percent of CDU supporters declared for Strauss, but 42 percent for Albrecht and a further 17 percent for Kohl; last week,

on the other hand, 46 out of 100 CDU voters thought the CDU/CSU had a "better chance of winning with Strauss" and now only 19 percent considered Albrecht the more attractive candidate for chancellor.

For comparison, the figures for Bavarian CSU voters are as follows: A total of 71 percent consider that the CDU and CSU have a better chance of winning with Strauss, and only 9 percent think they have less of a chance with Strauss than they would have with Albrecht.

Whereas most CDU/CSU voters are oriented toward Strauss, a minority of 16 percent would prefer the SPD chancellor to their own candidate in a direct vote.

On the other side the distance from the CDU/CSU has increased since Strauss became the challenger. And the opinions there count for more than does the mood in one's own camp. Only by winning votes there can the opposition hope for a change in government in 1980.

The time between the nomination of Strauss and election day is still more than a year, and the EMNID poll of last week, like any other poll, can be no more than a current reflection of the views and mood among the voters. But it shows clearly the well-nigh insurmountable obstacles for candidate Strauss in the way of becoming chancellor.

Among all the groups where the CDU/CSU would have to gain voters in order to win, Strauss continues to repel, not attract, the majority.

This is true, for example, of workers and employees as well as of the population of the northern Laender (Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Bremen) and North Rhine-Westphalia. Further, the higher the education of those polled and the younger they are, the greater is their disassociation from the new candidate of the opposition.

Majorities among these groups think more highly of Albrecht than they do of Strauss, regard the prospects of Strauss against Schmidt as smaller than do other persons polled and would prefer the SPD's Schmidt to the CSU's Strauss in the election of a chancellor. And among these groups there are also more voters than in any other who say that as far as they are concerned a CDU/CSU with Strauss "is not really a possibility."

There is every indication that Strauss' calculation that a polarization of the election campaign will finish the FDP is also wrong. Here are a couple of such indications from the SPIEGEL poll:

In previous polls it generally turned out that only two out of three FDP voters leaned toward the SPD in individual questions, with one in three being closer to the CDU/CSU; now the majority leaning toward the SPD is far greater.

And persons polled who can no longer vote for a CDU/CSU with Strauss as candidate for chancellor more often name the FDP than the SPD as the new party of their choice.


Was It the Right Decision?

On behalf of DER SPIEGEL, the Bielefeld EMNID Institute polled 1,000 men and women representative of FRG voters.

Many FRG citizens think the decision of the CDU/CSU to go with Franz Josef Strauss as candidate for chancellor into the 1980 Bundestag elections was wrong.

This is shown by the answers to this question: "What do you think of the election prospects of the CDU/CSU? Are they greater with Strauss as candidate for chancellor than with Albrecht? Are they about the same with both? Or are they smaller with Strauss than with Albrecht?"

The percentages of all persons polled are:




KEY: 1. Greater with Strauss than with Albrecht
2. About the same with both
3. Smaller with Strauss than with Albrecht
4. The percentages among CDU/CSU voters:

5. Greater with Strauss
6. Smaller with Strauss
7. The percentages among SPD voters:
8. Greater with Strauss
9. Smaller with Strauss

62 Percent: Schmidt Will Win

Germans think the current federal chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, has a better chance than his challenger, Franz Josef Strauss, to win the 1980 Bundestag elections.

This is shown by the replies to the question: "Who do you think will win the 1980 Bundestag elections--the SPD and FDP with the current federal chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, or the CDU and CSU, with Franz Josef Strauss as candidate for chancellor?"



- KEY: 1. Percentage of persons polled who think the SPD and FDP will win with Helmut Schmidt:
2. Percentage of those who think the CDU/CSU will win with Franz Josef Strauss
3. Percentage among CDU/CSU voters:


4. SPD and FDP will win with Helmut Schmidt
5. CDU/CSU will win with Franz Josef Strauss
6. Percentage of SPD voters
7. SPD and FDP will win with Helmut Schmidt
8. CDU/CSU will win with Franz Josef Strauss

Which Party Would You Vote for?

"Which party would you vote for if the Bundestag elections were held next Sunday?" The replies to this question yielded a majority for SPD and FDP coalition parties.

59 Percent Prefer Schmidt to Strauss

If the federal chancellor were elected by direct vote, Franz Josef would receive fewer votes than there are CDU/CSU voters. If they had a choice between Strauss and Schmidt, the percentages of all persons polled would be:



- KEY: 1. "Green Lists"
 2. Other or none
 3. for Schmidt
 4. for Strauss
 5. Percentages of CDU/CSU voters:
 6. Percentages of SPD voters:


9 Percent for CDU/CSU, Against Strauss

A total of 13 percent of FRG citizens are changing the party of their choice because Strauss was nominated candidate for chancellor.

A total of 4 percent stated: "Normally I would not vote for the CDU/CSU, but with Strauss as candidate for chancellor, this party is not really a possibility as far as I am concerned."

A total of 9 percent states: "Normally I would vote for the CDU/CSU, but with Strauss as candidate for chancellor, this party is not really a possibility as far as I am concerned."


This was stated by the following percentages:



Northern Lights are Somber

The opinions about the CDU/CSU election prospects with Franz Josef Strauss as candidate for chancellor vary greatly depending on the Land.

Percentages of those polled:



- KEY: 1. "Prospects greater with Strauss than with Albrecht"
 2. "Prospects greater with Albrecht than with Strauss"
 3. Northern Länder


Younger Voters: Two-Thirds Majority for Schmidt

The younger the voters, the greater is the majority of those who in a direct election of the chancellor would vote for Schmidt and against Strauss. Percentages, according to age, of people polled:

KEY: 1. For Strauss
 2. For Schmidt
 3. 18 to 24 years old
 4. 25 to 34
 5. 35 to 49
 6. 50 to 64
 7. 65 years or older

8790

CSO: 3103



STRAUSS GIVES VIEWS ON ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Jul 79 p 4

[Article by Friedrich Karl Fromme: "Candidate Strauss' Views on Election Campaign for Chancellorship"]

[Text] CSU-Chairman Strauss, who has been Bavaria's minister-president for approximately 6 months and who is now representing the Union parties, CSU and CDU, as candidate for the chancellorship during the 1980 Bundestag election, is facing the task of providing shape and substance to a jointly conducted election campaign, or at least, being the primary force behind it. In the process, Strauss will have to settle disputes with those CDU members who want to use the election campaign for the announcement of more comprehensive sociopolitical decisions. According to statements made to the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Strauss feels that it is not only in order and necessary but, keeping in mind the aspect of publicity, also possible to point to the limitations of the social-welfare state, which would be apparent if there were a liberal order based on a certain degree of individual responsibility. Furthermore, Strauss is of the opinion that the Union could not maintain credibility if, on one hand, it demands a permanent reduction of the government's share in the gross national product and, on the other hand, calls for additional expenditures, for instance, for general child-support payments or retirement benefits for partners or any other payments for "new social problems which continue to arise." The reduction in the increase of the national debt (which is not, or not yet the reduction of its absolute size) cannot be demanded if there are simultaneous demands whose fulfillment presupposes an increase in government spending.

Apparently Strauss is not yet quite sure how to guarantee that the Union campaign will not conflict with his own positions, at least not in essential areas. He knows that the decision of this question between the two Union parties, or more accurately, between the CSU and segments of the CDU on one hand and the rest of the CDU on the other hand, is of a highly political nature and extremely sensitive and that in this respect personnel factors are playing a significant role as well. Nevertheless, in the opinion of Strauss, the major problem is not the social committees or their chairman Bluem, who recently indicated his willingness for limited cooperation, something which did not escape the attention of Strauss.

Strauss is envisioning an election campaign which is not characterized by confrontations on issues. During the energy debate on 4 July in the Bundestag, he delineated a position for the CDU/CSU majority which he wants to apply to the election campaign as well: Cooperation with the government wherever it appears that with regard to the national interest the government and the opposition hold similar views. It is a pragmatic willingness for compromise wherever differences of opinion can be brought into line without sacrificing essential items. In this respect Strauss likes to quote decisions of recent years on tax policies, in all of which he was involved representing the Union position in the Bundesrat, giving us some things he considered important, approving of some plans of the government, achieving some partial improvements within the framework of Union policies. Finally, confrontations take place where the views of the governing majority and the opposition are irreconcilable. In this respect, Strauss mentions the example of the new youth-assistance program: It is intolerable that government-paid functionaries should interfere in family affairs, even if it were done under the pretext of very tempting material assistance. It appears that Strauss does not question the CDU's ability with regard to the first two positions (i.e., there should be no difficulties concerning a joint approach to the election campaign in these areas). He has doubts, however, whether there exists a willingness everywhere in the CDU to unconditionally defend the positions in the (few) decisive and differentiating questions.

It is likely that a committee will consider the joint election campaign, the basic positions of which, as things stand now, will be determined by Strauss. This, however, would revive the old difficulties between the CDU and CSU in a new context, while attempting to agree on a common candidate for the chancellorship and, at any rate, the composition of such a committee--small in numbers--would already be looked upon as a part of a preliminary decision. Strauss has a tendency to avoid commitments on paper and to rely on his personal appeal during the election campaign. ("I am a plebiscitary type, not a functionary.") Nevertheless, he also knows that this is not enough to fill out the entire election campaign.

Strauss wants to plan his election campaign in such a manner that the voters will be offered a distinct alternative to the policies of the SPD/FDP coalition, not in every area but in a few important questions. Nevertheless, he does not want to be a person like Churchill, promising "blood, sweat and tears," because Schmidt might then emerge as someone who promises "the good life, sun and joy." If these two extreme forms do not come about (an election campaign can certainly develop its own laws), it is quite possible that both, Strauss as well as Schmidt, will make an appeal, each in his own way, to be satisfied with what has been achieved, to elect those who have the best abilities for the preservation of what has been accomplished. Due to the prevailing "conservative" mood among the voters, this would eventually produce an advantage for the incumbent.

Strauss is counting on the fact that topics like the energy crisis, certain FRG foreign policy orientations (Near East) which have been kept in limbo by the Federal government might have to be decided in the middle of 1980

and that this will provide an opportunity for lending substance to the election campaign in a manner which will accentuate adequately the differences between him and Schmidt. Nevertheless, Strauss has no intention of repeating this slogan of the 1976 election campaign, "Freedom or/Instead of Socialism" although he still considers the formula the right one because it conceptualizes the crucial question of our time in Central Europe. Certainly, not every social-democratic voter is a socialist or someone who is not concerned about freedom. The main thrust, however, is--and in this respect Strauss does not totally ignore the Union when making his critical comments--whether politics are moving in the direction of demanding individual responsibility or making it impossible because of its tendencies.

At any rate, with regard to the question of party formation in the FRG, an idea with which Strauss has been toying for a long time and, as a result, has been experiencing a certain measure of satisfaction about the public interest which has been aroused, the "Fourth Party" has been shelved until the Bundestag election. Unless there are indications from within the CDU that this topic is being treated in a manner which would force Strauss to act or, at least, to express himself publicly. If the Union loses the Bundestag election, Strauss, who, if this should occur, is determined to remain Bavaria's minister-president rather than, perhaps, go to Bonn as leader of the opposition (he says that there are practically no adverse comments from the CSU about his new Bonn undertaking), would certainly have to retreat to the currently valid position of interests. The Bavarian minister-president might not be inclined to give up the Bavarian CSU with its peculiarly public appeal, in other words, its ability to permanently coalesce opposite interests. An expansion might attract the competition, the CDU, to Bavaria and it might then challenge the unique position of the CSU, the party in power which alone is responsible for all decisions in Bavaria. Strauss does not agree with the thought that a party formed for reasons of political tactics alone is not viable and that the extent to which the Union parties would split and go their separate ways would depend upon the extent to which such a newly created party would be endowed with substance. He looks upon the "Citizens' Party" of Fredersdorf as "competition," using this word deliberately, probably to provide a contrast to "enemy" and "friend." Anyway, Strauss is benevolently applauding Fredersdorf's action by indicating that it is good for the big parties when a small one uses such demands as simplification of taxes and debureaucratization in order to place thorns in the flesh of big ones.

With regard to the FDP, Strauss feels that there is no indication of a movement toward relaxing the well-established coalition politics which have existed for approximately 10 years. His assessment of the situation within the FDP is as follows: Two-thirds "Social Liberals," one-third Old Liberals. Nevertheless, Strauss sees within the FDP a certain disenchantment with the coalition. Theoretically, at least, there is a long-term possibility that the FDP might change its course and reestablish a coalition with the Union. If this should occur, he or someone like him at the helm of the Union would not be a hindrance. Anyway, the FDP needs a coalition partner which would accentuate the differences rather than one with which it

harmonizes. On the other hand, Strauss is not counting on the FDP for the foreseeable future, and he thinks it is a big mistake for the Union to do so.

He assesses his prospects of being elected soberly; he anticipates the election campaign with calmness, being 64 years old and assured of a definite spot in Bavaria for the rest of his active political life. He does not expect a large number of voters to vacillate between the FDP and CDU. Strauss is particularly counting on the traditional Union voters, those who will set aside reservations when things get tough. On the other hand, he thinks it is possible to make inroads into segments of the SPD voter potential (an opinion which he shares with leading SPD politicians). He has proletarian traits, so he says, exaggerating with some irony. It is not possible to predict where this can be translated into votes.

8991

CSO: 3103

BAUM INTERVIEWED ON FDP ELECTION PROSPECTS

Bonn DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 27 Jul 79 p 5

[Interview with Gerhart Baum by Ludolf Herrmann: "Chance for the FDP"]

[Text] DEUTSCHE ZEITUNG: Minister Baum, the candidacy of Franz Josef Strauss for the chancellorship could mean two things for the FDP. First, it is conceivable that the electoral campaign between Schmidt and Strauss will be polarizing to a degree that the FDP will simply disappear and fail to clear the 5-percent hurdle. The other possibility is that a wandering voting potential could arise between the Schmidt-voters and the Strauss-voters, and that it could be captured for the FDP. Which of the two possibilities do you consider more likely?

Gerhart Baum: In the next months the political landscape will change profoundly in anticipation of the elections. Many voters will reorient themselves. The FDP is always affected when voters reorient themselves. It is affected both negatively and positively. The FDP is essentially a party of the swing voter; the proportion of its loyal voters is small. There will be no transparent campaign maneuvers on the part of the FDP, and no opportunistic policy of accommodation. It will appeal to the liberal swing voter by a logical continuation of its policy under Genscher; it will appeal to the voter who angrily turns from a campaign of the so-called strong men. Indeed, the party can appeal to the thoughtful citizen who rejects Strauss and who does not want to leave Schmidt alone with the SPD. This is a good possibility.

[Question] It seems now as if Franz Josef Strauss is attempting to assume a basically moderate, in some respects thoroughly liberal position. He apparently wants to limit the confrontation to personalities, to the alternative Schmidt/Strauss. Do you not perceive here a danger for the FDP after all?

[Answer] The campaign cannot after all be reduced to a denominator of two. I am not one of those who condemn Strauss and who measure him only by his past. But he cannot disguise himself. He is no liberal, he is not likely to appeal to thoughtful voters who reflect on the issues and do not think in terms of black and white cliches. Strauss' Sonthofen speech--a thoroughly

illiberal document--cannot be forgotten. Above all, he will not succeed in uniting the entire CDU behind him. The CDU would have to deny itself to do that. Strauss demands of the CDU that it suspend its program and partially surrender its identity.

[Question] Is that not something that the FDP is also going through with the SPD?

[Answer] No. Naturally, in a coalition compromises have to be made by both sides. The socialist-liberal coalition has proven to be quite effective up to now.

[Question] The fact that the FDP at its latest party congress in Bremen paid great attention to the positions of the taxpayers' party and the "Greens" has led to positions that would not necessarily make your party more attractive to confused liberal-conservative CDU voters.

[Answer] I would not say that. In 1972 at Freiburg the FDP made it clear that it is aware of the social component of liberalism. It is no longer just a party of the so-called economic liberals but it also supports equality of opportunity in educational policy, it is in favor of an accumulation of wealth that benefits broad segments of society, it supports participation by workers in plant management. That was an attempt to define the freedom-furthering components of the state, to stress that the state has an important function in advancing individual liberty. Freedom from poverty, freedom from need is just as necessary as freedom of the entrepreneur.

[Question] The state as an institution that supports freedom is basically not really a primordial liberal idea.

[Answer] Correct. That is why there must in any case exist defensive means against the state which can also have antiliberal tendencies. Every large organization, not only the state and its bureaucracy, but also the large economic organization, the large associations in our land, both unions and business associations can infringe on liberty.

I shall just summarize a few points: Criticism of the bureaucracy and criticism of legislation. Why so many laws, why not laws of limited duration? Why not better controls over the effects of the legal regulations? The FDP is also challenged wherever the constitutional state is endangered, wherever the bureaucracy is becoming even stronger due to the new methods of technology. Only one word here: Protection of data. The FDP is called for in taxation questions, which are basically inimical to freedom, whenever the achievement of the individual is penalized by progressive taxation. There is need for the FDP whenever the problem of economic competition is acute, wherever it is necessary to solve crisis situations--such as the current energy crisis--with market forces. Here you can include all the program points of a modern liberalism up to communal reform.

The communal reform that we carried out in all Laender has, however, also destroyed civil liberties. My party must be prepared to acknowledge mistakes that have been made in this respect.

[Question] Some of this seems to be very much in conflict with your previous positions. You now say that the state must further freedom. Simultaneously you want to oppose bureaucracy. But wherever the state has previously played the role of freedom's guardian there has always arisen more bureaucracy. You say that you want to further competition. But when you were the chairman of the FDP program committee you maintained positions that smacked of controlled investments. Can this be interpreted as an early accommodation to the changing electoral conditions?

[Answer] No. Whatever I say now I have already stated earlier, also at the Hesse Landtag election campaign last year. We need many legal regulations to implement environmental protection. But surely we do not need so many regulations for our educational system.

[Question] Permit me to give another example. Has the FDP anywhere cooperated in the revision of communal reform like in the case of Lahn, that has been made a campaign issue by the CDU?

[Answer] Within the FDP there is a growing conviction that a counterreformatory movement must be started, not for a total revision but surely for a partial one.

[Question] Is the consciousness within the social-liberal faction of the FDP also growing in the question of free market economy?

[Answer] The FDP does not see any conflicts between the minister of economics, Count Lambdorff, who advocates the free activity of the individual in the economy and others, who like me, quite definitely point to the limits of growth and stress the inevitable need for a preventive environmental and raw materials policy.

[Question] Turning to the topic of education. In 1972 the FDP decided to favor an integrated comprehensive school and has not abandoned that position. Will it now--in view of the potential ex-CDU-voter--be more modest or even embark on a revision?

[Answer] Being liberals we do not belong to those who want to enforce happiness on mankind. Thus we do not favor a school reform merely for the sake of a school reform; rather we ask ourselves which school structure will be best suited to reach the pedagogical goals. In this we are more open than the Social Democrats, as was shown during the debates in Nordrhein-Westfalen over the question of the comprehensive school. No school structure should be condemned but there are also no singularly blessed school structures. The parents have to be convinced of the need for such a reform.

[Question] The FDP has espoused the emancipation view and its family policy has been built on that view. Consequently it demands that nurseries and all-day schools be instituted to enable the working mother to continue on her job. Moreover, regarding the question of Paragraph 218 even after the decision of parliament and the supreme court, the FDP favored interruption of pregnancy. How do you plan to recruit a conservative voter with such positions?

[Answer] Our aim must be to win those who have an open mind regarding changes in the society. We do not favor abortion, but we reject the notion that the individual has to answer to the judge in each case. We concentrate very much on the realization of equality between man and woman. This we will continue to do, because there is still a lot to be done here. However, the impression should not arise that we only advocate the working mother. Over the past years it was not made clear that the woman who decides to remain with the children and the family can also develop herself fully.

[Question] Shouldn't you in that case have voted against the maternity allowance that only brings benefits to the working woman?

[Answer] No. First of all we have to give the working mother the opportunity to have children. The second step would be the extension of the same opportunity to the housewife. But that is a financial problem.

[Question] Can't one see here the old priorities? For the working woman the necessary funds are found, but for the nonworking one there is to be a wait until the sky rains gold?

[Answer] There is indeed a priority but in my opinion it is justified since after all there many women who have to work out of necessity.

[Question] At Bremen the FDP decided to propose a revocation of Paragraph 88a of the Criminal Code, i.e. the prohibition against glorifying violence in literature. You want to revise the contact denial law that is designed to prevent cooperation between free and imprisoned terrorists in exceptional cases. The FDP has been in the forefront of those demanding a revision of the so-called extremist decree. Are you not putting yourself into conflict with the voters of vacillating center?

[Answer] The FDP, as I have defined it up to now, is a party of civil liberties. Civil liberties include rights of freedom in a constitutional state. They are laid down in the catalog of our basic rights and are expressed in laws. These rights to liberty can only be limited to the extent that is absolutely necessary for the defense of the state. That then is the limit. The CDU always directs its policy a bit more toward order and security. The liberals, on the other hand, want to guarantee freedom to the greatest possible extent. That means, they are more ready to take risks, without neglecting the necessity to defend the state. However--the constitutional state can only defend itself with constitutional means. They cannot be surrendered when the state defends itself. We cannot do the terrorists the favor of making the state ugly, so that the struggle against it becomes attractive.

[Question] Minister, to summarize--will the FDP be attractive for a new, perhaps more conservative voter, or will it at least attempt to be?

[Answer] The FDP can surely provide a shelter for those who have a liberal basic attitude and cannot find that in the CDU under Strauss. Within that party there have always been noticeable voices--heard, for example, at the special conferences of the CDU--that were from a liberal point of view much more interesting than the policy of the CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction. The previous supporters of the CDU from that sector will certainly find the FDP appealing.

[Editorial note] Approximately one-third of the FDP voters are the loyal adherents. The rest must be painstakingly gathered together by the party. This time the party might have a chance with former CDU voters who do not want to support Strauss next year. But this is made difficult by the wish of the party to present its own profile without regard to the peddling tasks. Can one be programmatically liberal and at the same time attractive to previous CDU voters? That is the point of our conversation.

The federal minister of the interior, Gerhart Baum, is the right man to talk about this topic. Within his party he is known as the chief theoretician. Baum developed for the FDP the guidelines for the liberal communal policy. He revised for his party the chapter on "State and Federations." Finally he directed the committee on future perspectives of the FDP before the 1977 Party Congress at Kiel. Baum is a member of the party presidium, and is considered to be a spokesman for its social-liberal wing.

9240

CSO: 3103

ANALYSIS OF FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French No 2, 1979 pp 213-247

[Article by Jean Klein]

[Excerpts] When the French Government, at the conclusion of the Council of Ministers on 24 August 1977, announced that it would "lead another effort at rethinking the disarmament issue and that it would present, when the time came, an overall plan," most observers saw in that approach the beginning of a change with regard to the policy which had been followed since General de Gaulle came to power. In short, in 1962, France had refused to occupy the seat reserved for it on the Committee of 18 on disarmament and had not taken part in the negotiations calling for the mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe (Mutual and Balanced Forces Reductions, or MBFR) which have been going on in Vienna since October 1973. In 1969, France had taken note of the U.S.-Soviet strategic dialogue known as SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), and while expressing the hope that this undertaking would succeed, it had clearly stated that this exercise was strictly bilateral, that its outcome did not involve third powers and that a medium power like France had no inclination to participate. Finally, it had regarded with suspicion most of the arms limitation agreements concluded after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, inasmuch as they were a hindrance to the setting up of a strategic nuclear force and merely fostered the development of a "balance of terror." Qualified sometimes by measures of partial disarmament, these agreements were actually aimed only at nonarmament and were concerned with arms control, a doctrine drawn up in the United States toward the end of the 1950's to meet the demands of "cooperation-competition" between the two protagonists at a time of nuclear parity. Their goal was not so much to begin a process of reduction of armament as to stabilize the relations of mutual deterrence between the two protagonists. Thus, one can understand that France, which had opted for a policy of independent defense in providing itself with a nuclear weapon, refused to sacrifice this element which is essential to its security, and is not any more disposed to do so today. Furthermore, arms control fell within the framework of prospects

for development of relations between the politico-military organizations set up at the time of the cold war, and since French diplomatic policy refused to accept the division of the world into "blocs" and acted in such a manner to hasten their dissolution, it could not endorse an undertaking which was aimed at consolidating them and which forced the small and medium powers to rely on the two Big Powers to guarantee their security. Finally, one had the right to doubt that arms control, which meant a tacit renunciation of disarmament, could make a significant contribution to the international regulations on armaments and to the reduction of military expenditures.

This rejection of arms control and the policy of the empty chair at the conferences where discussions were going on resulted in sharp criticism of the French Government, both by internal opponents of the "strike force" as well as by partners and allies, annoyed at seeing France go it alone or worried about the consequences which the development of independent nuclear forces would have on the stability of deterrent parity. In this regard, one can recall the outright condemnations of the Strategic Nuclear Force (SNF) by the U.S. Government during the 1960's and the campaigns waged against nuclear arms testing programs in the Pacific at the beginning of the 1970's, since New Zealand and Australia did not hesitate to challenge the legality of the French nuclear tests before the International Court of Justice in the Hague, and certain bordering countries broke off their diplomatic relations with France as a sign of protest.

Nevertheless, as time went on, it was clear that the disarmament negotiations were not bringing about the effects counted on and that the agreements reached did not result in a reduction of arsenals, nor in a slowing down of the quantitative and qualitative arms race. The continual increase of world military expenditures during the period over which the successive sessions (1962-1978) of the Disarmament Committee Conference (DCC) were held attests to the futility of the efforts made within this framework to achieve the goal set in the United Nations Charter, i.e. "maintaining international peace and security in using only a minimum of the world's human and economic resources for arms." (art. 26)

Moreover, the critical role played by the United States and the Soviet Union in the drawing up of the treaties discussed in Geneva and the course of action which the cochairmanship system allowed them turned the DCC into a chamber for recording agreements resulting from their own private understanding. Such a procedure was bound to antagonize the representatives of the other member countries, and especially the neutral and nonaligned countries which, ever since 1971-1972, have advocated reform of the disarmament committee and demanded more active participation in the negotiations which were taking place under its auspices. When this request was not granted, they took up the idea again of a world conference which they had suggested for the first time in Belgrade in 1961. The Soviet Union had made a definite proposal to this effect at the United Nations in 1971

and a preparatory committee for the world conference had been set up. Nevertheless, Chinese objections and American reservations were an obstacle to the realization of this project and therefore the idea of a special session of the UN General Assembly won out, and the principle of such a meeting was unanimously approved on 21 December 1976 (Resolution 31/189B). (See: "The World disarmament conference: an analysis of a disarmament effort" in *International Detente and Disarmament*, Tampere, Peace Research Institute, Helsinki, 1977, and Unto Vesa's article, "The special session on disarmament: a turning point?", *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, No 1, 1978.) France, which shared some of the concerns of the Third World and challenged the structure and the operation of the DCC, took advantage of the opportunity of the special session to make its views known on the organization of deliberation and negotiation procedures, while making an original contribution to the definition of the general principles of disarmament and the development of a program of action.

Finally, French nuclear policy was the target of general hostility; people were either criticizing France for setting a bad example for countries which might acquire the new weapon, or they felt that the continuing of France's testing program posed an obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty putting a total ban on nuclear weapons, or else they felt that French nuclear strategy--strategy of the weak confronted by the strong, based on having enough means of retaliation and on autonomy of decision as regards using these means--was incompatible with active participation in negotiations calling for the development of military parity in Europe. The question was especially crucial, considering that things were on the way toward a conclusion of the SALT II agreement and more and more people were calling for the inclusion of "gray area" weapons in the following phase of the process. In Vienna, talks on the mutual reduction of forces were at a virtual standstill, but an agreement on the ceiling of forces deployed in the central area could not be ruled out, thanks to the progress made by SALT, so that French diplomatic policy was running the risk of finding itself faced with a possibility that it had deliberately ruled out up to then. The extreme misgivings shown from the very beginning with regard to an undertaking leading to the setting up of an area with a special status right in the middle of the continent were still present, but it was undoubtedly to meet in advance the challenge which an MBFR-type agreement would pose that the French Government suggested opening up the discussion to all the countries which were members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and suggested studying the means of restoring trust and correcting the imbalance in conventional weapons in the area from "the Atlantic to the Urals." That way it would escape the dilemma of pure and simple rejection of any development of balance in Europe and of supporting the MBFR, of which it had continually denounced the dangers to the security and independence of the countries on the continent.

In order to judge the new ideas in the French "speech" on disarmament, we should briefly summarize the proposals made by the government during the preparatory phase and during the special session of the United Nations which was held in New York from 23 May to 30 June 1978. We will then examine the response with which they met and the follow-up to certain proposals, such as those which dealt with the reform of negotiation procedures. Finally, we will look at France's chances to advance the undertaking of disarmament within the framework of the new Geneva disarmament committee or through the European Conference on Disarmament, of which it suggested calling a meeting to the other 34 member countries of the CSCE. Only at the end of this survey will we hazard any guesses on the nature of the change which has taken place in French policy, emphasizing the constraints imposed on a medium nuclear power which is concerned about contributing to disarmament without compromising the credibility of its defense capabilities until the end of the process.

NEW FRENCH PROPOSALS WITH A VIEW TO DISARMAMENT

The communique issued by the Council of Ministers on 24 August 1977, in which the government emphasized the importance it gave to the problem of disarmament and announced the presentation, "when the time came," of an overall plan, had disconcerted most observers. Wondering about the reasons for such an approach, they were at first inclined to feel that it was a tactical maneuver intended to put an end to the campaign of the leftist opposition on the eve of the legislative elections of which the stakes were extremely important. The publication in the daily newspaper LE MONDE (14 and 15 December 1977) of two articles by Mr Francois Mitterrand on the same subject tended to give credence to this viewpoint, since one was led to believe at the time that the goal of the First Secretary of the Socialist Party was to reduce the advantage of the presidential majority on this ground in unveiling the general outline of a socialist disarmament plan before the government explained its ideas on the subject. The French Communist Party pointed out that the official statements, and especially the speech given on 28 September 1977 by Mr de Guiringaud at the UN General Assembly did not point to "any solution, any constructive measure, any initiative that France could take to advance disarmament" and called for further details. At the same time, it kept its distance from the Socialist Party, whose views on the matter it did not share. And by virtue of the trials and tribulations of updating the common program of the union of the left, the Socialist Party and the French Communist Party were subsequently led to define--each on its own--separate programs which reflected their differences of opinion. Thus, the Socialist Party (PS), at the conclusion of its national convention on 7 and 8 January 1978, passed a motion on security and defense which defined the general outline of a strategy with a view to disarmament, while the French Communist Party (PCF) on the following 12 May, submitted a memorandum containing its proposals, preceded by an introduction on the "goals and methods of French disarmament policy." (See: L'HUMANITE, 16 May 1978.) It is

known that at the time of the setting up of the parliamentary delegation which was to go to New York for the special session of the UN General Assembly, the differences of opinion between the PS and PCF were highly apparent, since the PS agreed to be represented, while the PCF declined the invitation.

In addition to these partisan quarrels, the basic issue was that of openness and continuity with regard to the previous policy which was characterized by a rejection on principle of arms control and a pragmatic approach in the handling of special cases (We have called this practice "a la carte disarmament"—"France and disarmament," May 1978). If one confines oneself to the official statements, nothing pointed to a breaking off from the philosophy and practices followed under the Fifth Republic. And both the speech given on 16 September by Prime Minister Raymond Barre at the National Press Club in Washington and Mr Louis de Guiringaud's speech at the UN General Assembly on 28 September 1978 did not deviate one iota from the previous policy, including that followed under the Fourth Republic. We were mainly reminded that the partial measures intended to ban or limit certain categories of arms and "the efforts of the two Big Powers to assure the balance of their strategic relations" could not be confused with the business of disarmament. The latter was to entail an actual reduction of arsenals and deal not only with nuclear weapons, but also conventional weapons; it was not to involve any discrimination "intended to favor any country, geographical area or type of weapon" and was to be carried out under equitable security conditions; it was to be an across-the-board disarmament, because "no nation can agree to lower its guard if the others do not do so," nor begin limitation of its weapons if the superpowers do not set an example first; finally, disarmament was to be accompanied by effective verification measures in which the United Nations would have an active role to guarantee their independence.

The statement of these very general principles included almost no mention of the manner in which the French Government envisaged their implementation. The reference to general and complete disarmament in the speech of the minister of foreign affairs at the United Nations appeared to be a vestige of the plans discussed in the 1950's, but then abandoned, and it was not very realistic to approach the problem in this way, considering the problems encountered in the past. Furthermore, a more active role on the part of France in this area raised questions of procedure and especially the question of a reform of negotiation procedures. The government still had misgivings with regard to the DCC, but in 1977 the president of the Republic had not ruled out the possibility of France's taking part in its proceedings, if the cochairman system were abandoned and if the conference offered "prospects of concrete results." That was conceding implicitly that, through appropriate reforms, the DCC could serve as a framework for genuine disarmament, and some people saw in that stance a slight shift from the doctrine which had been laid down a year earlier, in the memorandum

on "the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the area of disarmament." At that time it was a question of setting up an interface between the negotiating organization and the General Assembly, i.e. the UN Disarmament Commission, which would require "either a radical change in the structures, procedures and probably the composition of the DCC, or its replacement by another organization." Now, there were still certain ambiguities in this regard which were not cleared up until January 1978, with the publication of the general outline of the French plan. This outline was explained in the televised interview which the president of the Republic gave on 9 February 1978 to four newsmen and in the document sent on 23 February to the preparatory committee for the special session of the General Assembly by the chief of the French mission at the United Nations. The most polished expression of the French viewpoint is the speech which Mr Valéry Giscard d'Estaing made in New York on 25 May, and the detail of the proposals made by the government were the subject of four memoranda published in May and June 1978: they dealt with, respectively, a European Disarmament Conference (EDC), an international verification satellite agency, the setting up of an international institute for research on disarmament and an international disarmament fund for development. It is from these texts that one can form an opinion on the philosophy and economics of the French proposals.

The French Government's approach claims to be both new and positive. Having recognized the failure of the disarmament effort carried on since the end of World War II and the state of excessive armament throughout the world, it feels that this situation can only be remedied by "reexamining in-depth the problem of disarmament." According to the French Government, it is no longer a question of resigning oneself to the apparent fate which leads to the accumulation of nuclear and conventional weapons, nor of deploring the insane waste of resources which could better be used for development,¹ but rather of seeking out the means to achieve real progress, beginning with "analysis of the actual conditions of our times." In this respect, the government was just as much against unilateral disarmament as it was against alinement with the Big Powers, for France would not contribute to world security by giving up its own security and neither would it serve the cause of disarmament in "enlisting to follow others on

1 (In his speech at the United Nations, the French president pointed out that total world military expenditures had more than doubled over the last 20 years and that the Third World's portion had gone from 4 percent in 1960 to 14 percent today. Furthermore, he calculated that the "billion dollars spent each year on military arsenals is the equivalent of health expenditures throughout the entire world and is 14 times greater than all the aid for development in all forms." He concluded that we are putting "14 times more importance on distrust than on solidarity.")

paths which experience has shown to lead to a dead end." Rather, it was necessary to clearly define the goal to be reached, the obstacles to be overcome and the course of action to be followed.

"The French approach to disarmament" is governed by three main ideas. The first is that every country has a legitimate right to security which implies the rejection of the utopian nature of a world which is totally disarmed. Of course, "France is not renouncing the ideal of a general and complete disarmament, which must be held onto as the ultimate goal." However, this goal can only be attained by considering the world as it really is and by respecting the right of all nations to security, even if it means defining its limits in order to avoid its abuse. Thus, disparities may result from an excess in the accumulation of weapons and from the uneven development of military arsenals of neighboring countries. These factors of imbalance give rise to feelings of distrust, encouraging the arms race, and they increase the likelihood of conflicts, so that an effort should be made to correct this lack of balance so that each country will arrive at the minimum level of armament needed to maintain its security.

The second idea is that disarmament must take into account regional situations as well as the strategic context. Indeed, the courses of action are very different from what they were 10 or 20 years ago, because the "problem is not confined to the improvement of relations between the superpowers and the military blocs which have been created around them, but its solution implies a universal and pluralistic dimension. Neither one can be overlooked. Hence, nuclear weapons concern all of humanity, but the regulation of nuclear arms cannot be considered in the same terms in areas where nuclear weapons are a factor in the general balance and in areas where introduction of nuclear arms would contribute to a marked imbalance." With regard to limitation of conventional arms, it is also by beginning with an analysis of the threats in a particular area that one can "hope to come up with the most effective measures and the consensus necessary for their implementation." In the final analysis, if the principles of disarmament are the same everywhere, their practical implementation must be adapted to the great diversity of existing situations and regional contexts.

The third idea is that disarmament is not the monopoly of a few, but rather must be the business of everyone. Most of the blocs where disarmament is being discussed were created at the time of the cold war, and despite the changes undergone, they still bear the mark of it. That is why the French Government made concrete proposals aimed at rooting the principle of universality in permanent institutions. First of all, it was a matter of reaffirming the authority and the responsibility of the United Nations and allowing all the members of the international community to make themselves heard in the general discussions on disarmament. This implied that at the deliberation level, the first commission of the General Assembly would be responsible for permanently following the question of

disarmament and that a new negotiating body (which might be designated as the "disarmament committee or DC") would replace the DCC. It would have 30 to 40 members, including countries having a special interest in disarmament and representing in a balanced manner all the areas of the world. The chairman would be elected for 2 years from among the participating countries, excluding the permanent members of the Security Council. Decisions would be made by consensus and negotiations would be carried on within the framework of the mandate defined by the Commission on Disarmament to which the DC would report. Finally, the nonmember countries would be allowed to participate in its deliberations as observers.

In addition to bringing the DCC into question and an in-depth reform of the deliberation and negotiation procedures, France proposed that three other institutions be set up which it felt could prepare for or work along with disarmament.

1. At the level of rethinking the issue, France feels that all the countries committed to the path of disarmament must be able to rely on objective technical studies dealing with the actual situation of armament throughout the world as well as with the various monitoring procedures. With this in mind, it is proposing the setting up--within the framework of the United Nations--an institute for research on disarmament which would be given complete scientific autonomy and of which the ground rules could be based on those of the UN Institute for Research and Training (UNITAR). The Institute would not duplicate the purpose of the UN Center for Disarmament, since the latter should carry out its work with regard to negotiations which are underway, for which it would continue to furnish essential technical support, while the former would concern itself with areas of research which are both more technical and more geared toward the future. The topics suggested would include such subjects as military technologies, comparative analyses of various systems of monitoring agreements and disarmament, the concept of the right to security and its enforcement. Of course, the UN Institute would work in close conjunction with the research institutes devoted to the study of similar issues.

2. Monitoring is the sine qua non condition of disarmament. So far, verification has been done mainly through national resources, which gives an advantage to countries which have mastered advanced techniques, especially those of satellite reconnaissance. As a matter of fact, only the United States and the Soviet Union currently have military observation satellites which enable them to observe the earth's surface at determined points and periods of observation and it is known that these instruments play an essential role in the verification of agreements which they have concluded with a view to limiting their strategic arms. Without ignoring the limits of this method of monitoring or underestimating the difficulties which international use of satellites would give rise to, France feels that "information useful for the strengthening of security and trust which can thus be obtained should be put at the disposal of all countries

concerned." France also proposes the setting up of an International Agency for Verification Satellites which would be responsible for collecting, processing and disseminating data obtained by satellites in areas with a direct bearing on the security of the countries and the monitoring of disarmament agreements. The Security Council could also use the services of the Agency on the basis of Article 34 of the UN Charter which allows it "to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to a disagreement between nations or give rise to a dispute." The Agency would be set up as a specialized UN institution and the timetable for the development of its technical resources would be divided into three phases: in the first phase, it would be responsible for interpreting and disseminating the data furnished by the countries having satellites; in the second phase, it would set up stations for collecting data linked directly to the national satellites; finally, in the third phase, it would have its own satellites and the technical abilities necessary for accomplishing its mission. Financing would be provided by both compulsory and voluntary payments, where technical resources put at the disposal of the Agency by the countries having satellites could be taken into account. Finally, the Agency could charge for the services rendered to the countries to ensure the monitoring of the disarmament or security agreements concluded by those countries.

3. Finally, disarmament must be carried out so as to benefit all. The blatant disproportion between the resources used for military expenditures and the resources devoted to aid for development is felt to be acceptable, and one of the duties of the international community is to redirect towards the meeting of the economic and social needs of the most deprived countries a portion of the amount spent on armament. With this in mind, France is proposing the creation of an international disarmament fund for development. Theoretically, this fund should be financed by savings on military expenditures through the implementation of disarmament measures decided at the regional or at the international level, but practically, such a procedure could not be implemented in the immediate future. That is why there should be an initial endowment of 1 billion dollars collected from voluntary contributions calculated according to simple criteria. Fifty percent of the financing could come from nuclear countries, proportional to the number of missiles they have, and 50 percent could come from countries which are both rich and heavily armed in accordance with criteria to be agreed upon. By contributing to the operation of this fund, the contributing countries would show their willingness to devote to peacetime efforts a portion of the resources used for military ends. Eventually, it would be a matter of arriving at a redistribution of the savings realized through disarmament, from which the most handicapped countries would benefit. Contributions made to the fund would be accounted for in the evaluation of the 0.7 percent of the gross national product set as the goal for official assistance for development.

If the duties and the ultimate purpose of these three institutions are the subject of concrete proposals, their structure and operation have barely been outlined, and the French Government expresses in every memorandum dealing with them the desire to see a group of experts set up which would be responsible for studying their implications. With regard to the International Agency for verification satellites, to which it seems to be according priority in the setting up of a new mechanism intended to encourage disarmament, it goes as far as defining the mandate of the committee of experts and anticipates that it will present a report on its proceedings at the 34th session of the UN General Assembly.

Having thus defined the principles and methods governing disarmament on an international scale, the French Government clarified its ideas in distinguishing between the geographical areas without nuclear weapons and the areas where they play an essential role in the balance of forces.

As far as the nonnuclear areas are concerned, the problem is twofold, since it is a matter, on the one hand, of slowing down proliferation of nuclear arms and, on the other hand, of slowing down the conventional arms race. France has reaffirmed its position against introducing nuclear weapons into areas where they would be a destabilizing factor, but France feels that the primary responsibility in this regard falls to the countries in the area. Nevertheless, these countries will only exercise this responsibility if they obtain guarantees concerning the free access to peaceful applications of the atom and the assurance of nuclear powers that they will not try to take political or military advantage of their situation. Also, the French Government has come out in favor of an open policy in the field of technology transfer and the marketing of fissionable materials and nuclear equipment, while taking precautions to eliminate the risks of misuse for military ends. Furthermore, the French Government also favors having entire continents or parts of continents designated as nonnuclear areas, and affirms its willingness to encourage this process by negotiating, with the countries which would choose this option, agreements guaranteeing against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. It was with this attitude that the French president expressed hope in his speech at the United Nations on 25 May 1978 that France could sign the No 1 protocol of the Tlatelolco treaty, a promise that was kept during the chief of state's trip to Mexico in 1979. Furthermore, the unwavering position of the French delegation, at the 10th special session as well as at the 33rd regular session of the UN General Assembly, was to associate the guarantees given to countries which did not have nuclear weapons with the setting up of "nonnuclearized areas."

But it is not enough to eliminate the nuclear danger of these areas; we must also counter the conventional arms race of which these areas are often the theater. In order to contribute to a solution to this problem, France stresses the conclusion of regional agreements of which the initiative would depend on the countries directly involved. It would be a matter

of determining a level of arms which would meet the reasonable security needs of the countries of "each of the major areas of the world," and of possibly making the necessary adjustments. The main difficulty lies in the definition of the "optimal level of security," but the success of a regional limitation on arms will depend mainly on the behavior of arms merchants, who have not shown any special moderation in the past, and who will continue to play the game of one-upmanship, exercising political pressure to put their products on foreign markets. Under these circumstances, we must combine both the limitation of arms purchases by the countries of a given area and consultation among the main supplying countries who would promise to regulate their arms shipments in accordance with the "security level" agreed upon by the purchasers. France is ready to play this game, provided that the countries of the area under consideration want to and provided that the major arms exporters, including the USSR, arrive at an understanding on limitation of the volume of transactions.

In other words, it is within a regional framework that a certain regulation of conventional-type arms transfers could be anticipated, on the condition that there is no discrimination among the suppliers and on the condition that all the countries of the region are willing. As Mr de Guiringaud was to say in his speech at the United Nations on 27 September 1978, "it is not from the outside, through some cartel of producers or by unilateral actions, that real progress can be made. It has to be based on the common willingness of the countries involved and their agreement on the goal and the scope of a verifiable regional agreement." Still, one may wonder whether the initiative taken by a group of Latin American countries (the Ayacucho statement of 9 December 1974), which the French minister hailed as an exemplary step, corresponds to the idea that people have about effective regional consultations. Apart from the fact that the pledges made in 1974 by those who signed the Ayacucho statement did not always guide their policies on the acquisition of arms, it was pointed out that Brazil, whose role is critical to the success of such an undertaking, did not participate. Furthermore, one can doubt whether the marketing of arms can be an issue for international regulation unless there is a halt to techno-strategic competition, indeed, unless there is an across-the-board disarmament. Finally, as far as France is concerned, the dependence of its weapons industries on foreign demand would--in the present situation--make adaptation of its policy of selling to countries which import a large portion of exported military equipment extremely difficult.

As far as the nuclear regions are concerned, the communique of the Council of Ministers of 25 January 1978 concerns the area between the Atlantic and the Urals which "is exceptionally important for world peace and for French security." Nowhere else is there such a concentration of nuclear and conventional arms, and therefore the new disarmament principles should be applied to that region. For this purpose, the government makes a distinction between nuclear arms, which have become a factor of overall

balance, and conventional arms, of which the disparities are obvious. As for nuclear weapons, it is not a matter of France's sacrificing the components of its deterrent force which will be maintained at the "level of credibility necessary for its security." It is up to the United States and the Soviet Union, which have an excess of nuclear resources and which continue to perfect them, to advance disarmament through a significant reduction. To this end, a favorable opinion was expressed on the negotiations calling for stabilization of their nuclear arsenals, with the reservation that the levels of arms envisaged in the agreements being discussed are very high and clearly disproportionate as regards the demands of world balance and mutual deterrence.

Actually, the major concern of the French Government is to correct the imbalance which characterizes the relationship of conventional forces in Europe, while maintaining its capabilities of deterrence, [allowing] "the weak to face up to the strong." The French Government also insists on the expansion of the area envisaged at the Vienna Conference on the mutual reduction of forces (Benelux, East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia) so as to include all opposing forces. The 35 countries which signed the final agreement in Helsinki would take part in an European conference on conventional weapons, the object of which would be the adoption of trust and the "reduction of the most destabilizing factors." In his TV interview on 9 February 1978, the French president explained his ideas on the subject: inasmuch as the imbalance of conventional forces deployed on both sides of the line of demarcation would, in a period of crisis, cause the outbreak of a major conflict in Europe, it is important to negotiate disarmament agreements to reduce, if not eliminate, this danger.

In his speech at the United Nations, the French president spoke of a broader area, "that which covers the major part of the Northern Hemisphere, from America to the Soviet Union, including Europe." This area is covered by nuclear deterrence, and nuclear weapons have become an integral part of the military balance. Thus, it would be a mistake to think that elimination of nuclear weapons could guarantee security for all. And what is more, such a measure would make an imbalance of conventional arms look like the cause of the greatest dangers. In the final analysis, it is not the existence per se of nuclear weapons which constitutes a threat, but rather accumulation and continual improvement of them.

As regards both quantity and quality, the rate of development is determined by the United States and the Soviet Union, and a halt to the arms race depends first of all on the effort of these two countries. It is a difficult undertaking, since it means bringing about "substantial reductions in the quantities of weapons and a freeze on technologies, without compromising either the security of the two countries, nor that of their allies." France's contribution to the limitation of nuclear weapons must

of necessity be very limited, considering the considerable disproportion between the strategic nuclear forces of the superpowers and the forces which France has at its disposal to provide for its security. That is why it is out of the question for France to participate in the conversations dealing with the limitation of strategic arms before the two superpowers have "considerably reduced the volume of their arsenals and put an end to the frenzied qualitative competition in which they are avidly engaged." For all that, nuclear disarmament would be quickly limited if the disparity of conventional weapons deployed in Europe were not corrected: "The obvious disparity of conventional weapons constitutes a real impediment to the reduction of nuclear resources." Hence the need for effecting an actual reduction of conventional-type weapons within the geostrategic area of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

That is why France informed all countries interested in the future of security on our continent and which therefore participated in the CSCE, of a plan for a European Disarmament conference (EDC). A memorandum, disseminated the day following the French president's speech at the United Nations, defined its goals, scope and procedures. It would mean approaching the problem in a cautious and gradual way, beginning with the adoption of measures geared to strengthen trust. Then, an attempt would be made to bring about the limitation and reduction of the most destabilizing conventional weapons, taking into account at each stage the right of all countries to maintain their security. The area to be considered would go beyond that of the MBFR and would cover all of the European territory of participating countries, from "the Atlantic to the Urals." Negotiations would deal with the major conventional air/ground weapons having strong offensive capabilities," as well as with forces and corresponding logistic support, once they are stationed in the area. This definition excluded naval forces and nuclear arms because, from the point of view of the French Government, it would be "wrong to try to individualize nuclear weapons concerning only the European theater, inasmuch as long-range strategic arms can be used in Europe just as well as tactical arms." Their fate, then, had to be discussed in other forums. Finally, if the EDC was different in every respect from the negotiations which took place within other confines such as the MBFR, the French Government was not excluding a priori the concomitant pursuit of the two approaches. At the conclusion of an exchange of views with the recipients of the memorandum, France would plan on calling a preparatory meeting for the conference on disarmament in Europe and would be willing to make concrete proposals with regard to its organization, with the understanding that the rules of procedure would be based on those of the CSCE, especially as regards the adoption of decisions by consensus and the rotation of the chairmanship. Already now, the government has detailed in two appendices to the memorandum what measures could be taken during the two phases of the EDC, both regarding the reestablishing of trust and the reduction of forces in the true sense of the word.

Such are the philosophy and the general economies of the French proposals on disarmament. How they were received, both at the UN Special Session and by the countries which received the memorandum on the conference on disarmament in Europe, remains to be examined.

The French memorandum on disarmament in Europe can be summed up in three proposals: expansion of the area, participation of all concerned countries in the negotiations and exclusion of nuclear arms.

1. The concept of "the Atlantic to the Urals" has given rise to misunderstandings insofar as people have thought it recalled de Gaulle's plan for pan-European security. In the case in point, it was merely a matter of defining a rather vast area in order to encompass the principal components of military parity in Europe and the criteria decided on could only be geographical. Proposing to improve the balance of power in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals does not mean that Soviet sovereignty over Asian territories is being challenged. On the contrary, the principle of equal security demands that one take into account weapons systems and armed forces deployed in the European area in the broader sense, for because of geographical imbalances, a genuine limitation of arms is only acceptable to the countries of Western Europe if the USSR opens its territory more generously to international verification. The French proposal does not include the bodies of water bordering the European continent. Now, countries like Malta, Cyprus and Yugoslavia have raised the question in the past of a limitation of naval armament in the Mediterranean. Thus, there is reason to wonder about the implications of extending the area of regional disarmament to the bodies of water surrounding Europe.

2. France wants to involve all the countries of the CSCE in the business of regional disarmament in Europe, which comports with the desires of small and medium countries. Thus, from the outset of the preliminary talks in Helsinki (November 1972-June 1973), Romania, Sweden and Austria have expressed the hope that questions bearing on the reduction of forces in Europe would be dealt with in a framework other than that of the MBFR, or, if not, that a close relationship would be established between the MBFR and the CSCE. In 1972, the USSR had come out in favor of a dissociation of these two negotiations, but in January 1973, it had planned on the expansion of the conference on the mutual reduction of forces, undoubtedly to put down the spirit of revolt which was being expressed in Helsinki and to win the support of France by playing down the "bloc against bloc" nature of the MBFR talks. Mr Pompidou had taken up the issue with Mr Brezhnev in Minsk (10-12 January 1973), and the remarks made at the conclusion of this meeting had lent credence to the speculations on a revision in the French position. It is known that this did not come about and that the Vienna Conference opened in October 1973, and participation was limited to the countries which were members of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact. Since then, 5 years have passed, and despite concessions made on both sides, there is still no conclusion in sight of a

satisfactory agreement on the mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe. In opening up new prospects, the EDC might start a revival of negotiations without compromising the search for a solution within the limited framework of the MBFR. For its part, the French Government has stated that it had no intention whatsoever of interfering in these negotiations and that it did not see any reason that the two exercises could not be conducted at the same time.

3. Reducing the scope of the negotiations to the armed forces and conventional-type weapons raises considerable objections, considering their overlap with the nuclear components of the military systems deployed on both sides of the line of demarcation. Furthermore, if it is felt that Soviet gray area weapons, such as the SS-20, constitute a threat to the Western countries, it would be to the advantage of these countries not to have their fate decided by an exclusively bilateral agreement concluded at the close of negotiations in which they have not been involved. In order to preserve their security interests, they should somehow be included in such an undertaking, even if it is only by closer consultations than SALT has brought about so far. Moreover, most of the nonnuclear countries are reluctant to participate in a conference on European disarmament which would be limited to the discussion of limitation of conventional weapons. Countries such as Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania and Sweden have clearly indicated that, on this point, they could not endorse the French proposal and that it should be amended so that limitation of nuclear forces could also be dealt with. In this respect, one should recall the development which French policy has undergone under the Fifth Republic, as far as disarmament is concerned. At the outset, nuclear disarmament was the main priority. Then the government emphasized the need for supplementing nuclear disarmament with a limitation of armed forces and conventional weapons, especially in its response to the Soviet memorandum of 1 July 1968. Today, emphasis is placed on the reduction of conventional weapons and it seems as if nuclear weapons are being overlooked in a geographical area in which they are a critical factor in the overall balance, but in which their quantitative accumulation and the qualitative arms race present dangers of destabilization.

However, the opposition is less strong than it seems *prima facie* and, on the part of the French, the complementary nature of nuclear and conventional components for the maintenance of military parity is recognized. Provided that the EDC comes to a successful conclusion, there would thus be the possibility of going further as far as general disarmament is concerned. As for the Eastern side, the initial objections to the French proposal have died down and in the Moscow statement of the Warsaw Pact members on 23 November 1978, there are passages reflecting their care to take into account the French ideas to promote "military detente and disarmament in Europe." In an election speech given in Moscow, on 2 March 1979, Mr Brezhnev considered the argument which holds that a ban on the

use of nuclear weapons would make recourse to conventional weapons more likely, and proposed the conclusion of a nonaggression pact among all the member countries of the CSCE. Finally, in the "program for the development of cooperation between France and Soviet Union in the interest of detente and peace," adopted at the conclusion of the French president's visit to the USSR (26-28 April 1979), the two sides agreed on the need for a joint examination by the countries which signed the final Helsinki agreement of "issues concerning the minimizing of military confrontation, appropriate measures for strengthening trust, the decrease in the concentration of weapons in Europe and their reduction." Of course, it would be dangerous to interpret these texts as the sign of an agreement of viewpoints of the Soviet Union and France on the EDC, but the current development is headed toward the adoption of a multilateral consultation procedure on a European regional scale. If circumstances allowed, this exercise could be a prelude to the calling of a conference in which all aspects of disarmament would be discussed, with the active participation of the European countries which cannot agree to rely on the two superpowers to organize the military balance on which their security depends, even if they admit their special responsibility in this area and the benefits of Soviet-American strategic dialogue.

In the past, rejection of arms control has been closely linked to the desire of the French Government to acquire the instruments for an independent military policy. To the extent that the French Government perseveres along this line, it is difficult for it to advocate giving up nuclear weapons in the very first stages of disarmament, especially since France currently has a credible deterrent force which is accepted by the majority of the French. In remaining attached to the idea of deterrence, France thus points up the impropriety of techno-strategic competition between the two superpowers and reserves for itself the possibility of maintaining a minimal nuclear capability until the conclusion of the disarmament process.

Such an approach comes up against two types of problems. First of all, the two superpowers are reluctant to commit themselves to a path which would lead to a drastic limitation on their strategic forces if one cannot manage first of all to bolt up the doors of the atomic club and maintain the distance separating the United States and the Soviet Union from the lesser nuclear powers. Hence, their insistence on a total ban on testing and the strengthening of the nonproliferation system. While not excluding a reduction of inventories during a subsequent phase, they did not have much to say on the procedures of the operation, but mainly insisted on the need for all nuclear powers to participate. To encourage their support, the USSR presented the DC with a working document concerning "negotiation on the halting of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and on the gradual reduction of their inventories until the final elimination of nuclear weapons," and explained that it was necessary to take into account the differences in the level of nuclear arsenals in order

to "determine the degree of participation of each of the countries concerned in the measures to be taken at such and such a phase." This posture should be pointed out, because the medium nuclear powers can only reject proportional and equal reductions which, for them, would be tantamount to unilateral disarmament. Neither can they play the arms control game, where they would definitely be the losers. Also, France should make use of the clout resulting from possession of nuclear weapons to begin the disarmament process and agree to give them up only within the framework of general and complete disarmament, under an effective international verification mechanism.

The second obstacle stems from the anti-nuclear bias which prevails at the United Nations and among the various authorities concerned with disarmament. The phenomenon was highly apparent during the 10th special session of the General Assembly--so much so that France had to keep its distance with regard to the paragraphs of the final document which were against the interests of its security policy. On the new disarmament committee, the first session of which ended on 27 April, there was also an offensive against nuclear weapons and many called for the test ban treaty, which had been in the making for more than 10 years, to be open to signature by all countries, without exception. Under these conditions, the path to which France committed itself in taking part in the proceedings of the Geneva Committee is a narrow one, since it will have to avoid the double pitfall of arms control, patterned after the two superpowers, and premature sacrifice of its nuclear force in the case of disarmament. In following a policy of openness in 1978, the government has clearly indicated that it hoped to resume the active role which France had had for a long time in the vital debate on disarmament. But it also hinted that if the DC strayed from the "principle of the universal right to security to return to basically bipolar compromises," France would be forced back to the misgivings it had in the past.

CSO: 8119/5988

ANALYSIS OF FRENCH ROLE IN FUTURE SALT TALKS

Paris POLITIQUE ETRANGERE in French No 2, 1979 pp 264-271

[Article by Pierre Lallouche]

[Excerpt] The changes in the strategic history which we have just reviewed has stimulated a new American-European "great debate" on the double theme: post-SALT and the consequences of the process for the security of Europe.

This date is particularly lively in the FRG, principal stake in the problem, where the most important party in the ruling coalition, the SPD, is deeply split over the security policy which would be appropriate for it to adopt henceforth. In the United States too, the future of the "arms control" policy and the consequences of the SALT agreements in Europe constitute, at this moment, two of the major themes of the debate on the possible ratification of SALT II. In Great Britain, these questions are especially pertinent following the May 1979 elections, considering the choices which the political leaders must make in the next year in view of the future of the deterrent force.

In contrast to the agitation which reigns in these three countries, the SALT agreements have not caused any debate of comparable magnitude in France. Everything occurs as if France had decided to voluntarily hold itself aloof from the general debate on the future of European security. There is in the great French silence something very paradoxical: at that time, in 1959, General de Gaulle was the first to predict the change in the balance of terror and its implications in relation to the credibility of the American guarantee in Europe, France is today mute at the very moment when its predictions are being realized, causing great confusion for our neighbors. On the contrary, the FRG which, up until very recently, contented itself with the modest role of conciliatory and discreet ally, today has, in the place of France, the major role as European "protester" against the United States.

How can this reversal be explained, and above all, to what can the French silence be ascribed?

At first glance, considerations of domestic policy seem to be paramount. Thus, the reaffirmation of former positions on 10 January and 15 February, far from answering the basic questions which we have just dealt with, was to serve to avoid all new domestic controversy on the orientation of the defense policy (similar to that of 1975-1977).

To a large degree, this objective seems to have been achieved: the reaffirmation of the principle of nonparticipation in SALT has actually seemed, in a satisfactory manner, to have answered the apprehensions of the Gaullists (See THE LETTER to the NATION of 8 January 1979, THE FINANCIAL TIMES of 11 January 1979 and LE MONDE on 23 January 1979). Regarding the opposition, it was careful not to cause a national debate on the SALT agreements and the defense policy: the Socialist Party, itself divided on this point, has never taken a position officially in favor of French participation in the SALT process. (In the only public text which mentions SALT (the two articles signed by Francois Mitterrand in LE MONDE on 14 and 15 December 1977 and titled "A Strategy for Disarmament") the position of the Socialist Party is actually very ambiguous. The first secretary of the party says there that "France should be present everywhere," all in emphasizing "the present absence (from SALT) of the two nuclear states of Europe: France and Great Britain." However, Mitterrand was careful not to propose French participation in SALT: he proposed--on the contrary--a "European conference on the reduction of forces and tension" which would include--contrary to the plan presented by Giscard d'Estaing--a "nuclear basket in which the nuclear countries and those with stockpiles of nuclear weapons would be represented.")

The Communist Party, the only political movement to advocate French entry into SALT III (See the article by Louis Baillot, "Make the Voice of France Heard," in L'HUMANITE of 23 January 1979; also see L'HUMANITE of 16 May 1978 and LE MONDE of 17 May 1978), while declaring itself a supporter of a fiercely independent deterrent force, seems well isolated within its own contradictions: more De Gaulle-like than the Gaullists by its adoption of the "tous azimuts" [omnidirectional] doctrine, the Communist Party simultaneously actually took up the Moscow position through its insistence on the presence of France in the SALT talks.

These partisan divisions, however, offer only a partial explanation and a very short term one for the French silence in the new "great debate" on the security of Europe. On closer examination, these apparently contrasting positions actually hide a double national consensus in the form of a refusal: refusal to integrate into the Atlantic alliance, but also the refusal to take into account the broadening political and military threat which the continually growing Soviet military potential casts over all of Europe. Thus, French silence could be deeply rooted in this common denominator, tacit and well rooted in the national sentiment at the same time: for the first time in its history "France is not on the front line," and because of that, the SALT talks "are not our problem." (The

demands of the security of France forbid France to mingle its voice in the talks on stopping nuclear tests, as well as elsewhere in those which have dealt with the limitation of strategic arms; this is not our problem..." General Mery, "The Future of Our Armies," p 29.)

Within this context, the basic characteristics of the French perception of the SALT talks and of the development of the strategic game of the superpowers clearly appear. This perception is above all political--indeed ideological--self-centered and uniquely linked around the strike force. The advantage of such a vision, is that reacting as "purists" of deterrence and not getting bogged down in the technological discussions in vogue in Washington or Bonn, the French analysts have been able to go right to the point--that is to the problem of the credibility of the American guarantee--well before the others. From which comes that other tendency--also French--which consists of nothing "that one has been right" in relation to the whole world. To restate the words of Michel Debre, the SALT talks are "an outstanding justification of the military policy of the Fifth Republic" because these "negotiations...reveal the precarity of the possible protection of Europe by the United States." However, for Jean-Louis Gergorin (Jean-Louis Gergorin, p 56), "the analysis...of the SALT talks...confirms the validity of the policy followed by France since General de Gaulle: to count above all on its own forces and especially on an independent deterrent capability."

Apparently satisfying in spirit while having the advantage of "ideological purity," such conclusions nevertheless have a double weakness:

--in the first place, this type of perception leads to underestimating both:

1. the rate--becoming faster and faster--at which changes in the strategic balance (reflected in SALT) take place;
2. and the impact of those changes on the security of France.

--in the second place, such a perception leads to a sort of withdrawal into one's shell or of political immobilization: Since the choices made have been justified by 20 years of history, it becomes appropriate to maintain the same policy while avoiding becoming involved in the new security problems such as those which are confronting our neighbors or proposing solutions to the post-SALT problem.

Let us reconsider these two points in trying to point out their weaknesses:

1. It would be an illusion to think that the increasingly faster changes in the relationship of strategic forces has no influence or only little influence on the security of France. Here we will deal briefly with only two examples: the first regarding Germany and the second the effectiveness of our nuclear potential.

--A Europe experiencing isolation following a change in the central balance, means, above all, a Germany experiencing insecurity and perceiving its insecurity. Stripped of the American protection, or no longer believing in it, such a Germany will inevitably be tempted by "Germanic" solutions which would include either a search for a "political accommodation" with the USSR, or the reverse, an imitation of the French model in matters of a national nuclear deterrence.

There is no doubt about it, each of these "solutions" would have direct, and scarcely positive, repercussions on the security of France. One cites as proof that now, at a time when Germany is beginning to question itself regarding the credibility of the American guarantee, other concerns are coming to light here and there in Europe and especially in France, regarding the significance of Mr Wehner's recent remarks regarding the USSR. (See LE MONDE of 21, 22 February and 10 March 1979; also see THE ECONOMIST, 31 March 1979 ("The Tempting of Germany"), or even regarding certain aspects of the civil nuclear program of the FRG. (See Mr Maurice Druon's remarks to the Assembly of the Western European Union (LE MONDE, 22 November 1978) on the atomic ambitions of the FRG.)

Whether one wishes it or not, the security of Germany is no longer only an American problem. France is most vitally concerned: not only due to the geographical proximity of the two countries, and the consequences of this in case of a conflict, but above all it seems that the economic and political links forged over 20 years have made the "Franco-German couple" the keystone of European stability and at the same time the "motor of European construction." (The last quote is from Raymond Barre's interview in LE MONDE, 25 April 1979.)

--The changes in the strategic balance affect France in another manner, more directly this time, which relates to the effectiveness of our own deterrent force. So far, this factor has only been timidly introduced into French strategic reasoning. This reasoning, based on the doctrine of massive reprisals of "the weak against the strong" has as a consequence the result that France does not have to enter into strategic competition with the superpowers. A minimum threshold of credibility is sufficient to maintain the strike force, as limited as it is, as a deterrent. From then on the whole problem is to maintain this threshold, while avoiding the development of an excessively large gap between the level attained through the competition of the superpowers and the qualitative level of the French deterrent force. It is at this point that the SALT agreements have the most direct impact on the deterrent capacity of the strike force. In the case of the ABM (SALT I) agreement, the impact was positive, since in limiting the antimissile systems of the superpowers, this agreement has contributed to upgrading the deterrent potential of the medium powers, such as that of France. On the contrary, the noninclusion of the Soviet Eurostrategic potential in SALT II could have negative consequences for France. The problem is in knowing if, due to its particular

characteristics (especially its extreme precision), the Soviet SS-20 missile will not cause certain elements of our strike force to face new threats which could affect the credibility of our overall deterrent. To this question, one has been able to respond that the ground and air components of the strike force have long been vulnerable to a first strike by the SS-4 and 5, predecessors of the SS-20. In short, the SS-20 would introduce "only a difference of degree": "It is of little importance that 5, 10 or 50 SS-20's have French targets, as long as our strategic force keeps the capacity to inflict unacceptable second-strike damage." On the military plane, however, the "difference" introduced by the SS-20 is basic: while the "dirty" inaccurate missiles such as the SS-4 and 5 would have destroyed the batteries of the Albion plateau, for example, as well as a large portion of the region's population, thus forcing the decision of massive reprisals, the extreme accuracy of the SS-20 and its antipersonnel capacity justify a "surgical disarmament" with a minimum of collateral damage. Partially disarmed, and having only the submarines on patrol available the government would then have to choose between a second reprisal strike with the almost certain of total destruction of the country, and negotiation.

2. Despite their extreme complexity, the problems which have just been raised give France the opportunity to act and to make its voice heard on matters of European security. The strike force, conceived by General de Gaulle as a means of giving France this capacity to act, must not today become an alibi for withdrawing into our shell, at the precise moment when the precarity of the American guarantee maximizes the importance of France's role and nuclear potential in Europe. Noting that General de Gaulle "was right" in an observation that henceforth is true of the past, to precisely the degree that he anticipated the situation of the times. Today France can continue to "be right" not by confining itself to immobilism, but anticipating as General de Gaulle did and in continuous adaptation of its doctrine and its resources in such a manner as to assure its security while developing its influence abroad.

Three paths of action will be outlined here:

--in the first place, it is a question of France taking into account that which relates to the military consequences of SALT, and in particular the level attained from now on by the Soviet nuclear forces (especially in the area of "Eurostrategic" weapons). This implies an accelerated effort in view of the growth and modernization of the deterrent force (increase in the number of nuclear submarines, adding MIRV capability, development of ground-ground medium-range mobile missiles). There is no doubt, such an effort supposes a reexamination of priorities both at the financial level and as regards the ultimate mission (nuclear and/or conventional) of the French armed forces.

--In the second place, it is a question for France of contributing to resolving the problem of German insecurity, whether in a bilateral manner

or trilaterally with the cooperation of Great Britain. As "daring" as it may seem, this path seems to be the only one reasonable, if one wants to avoid having the "German problem" presenting itself in even more serious terms during the next decade; in that regard one recalls that General de Gaulle had, in 1963-1964, envisaged offering the FRG the protection of the French nuclear umbrella. Germany had then refused to choose between France and the United States, thinking the American protection more credible. Since then, one has seen, things have changed...

--In the third place, it is a matter of bringing a French contribution to the post-SALT problem. Today it seems clear that this process had not only run aground on its objectives (limitation of the arms race and promotion of detente), but that it also contains risks for the security of Europe. This failure of the SALT agreements actually reveals a crisis of the whole process and of the theory of "arms control" conceived and imposed by the United States since the 1960's. France must be able to contribute to the search for new solutions on the plane of negotiations on security. The French proposal of a disarmament conference in Europe constitutes a beginning which should be built upon in the future.

CSO: 8119/5992

BRIEFS

MILITARY MANEUVERS--President Giscard d'Estaing will be an observer at the "Saone 79" military maneuvers early October in the sixth military region. These maneuvers will involve 18,000 men; 5,000 vehicles, 850 of which will be armored vehicles, with the participation of the 6th, 7th and 10th armored divisions, based respectively at Strasbourg, Besancon and Chalon-sur-Marne; as well as elements of the First Army Corps stationed in Metz. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Aug 79 p 17]

CSO: 3100

AZORES' MOTA AMARAL ON REGION'S FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 17 Jul 79 pp 9, 10

[Interview with President Mota Amaral of the Regional Government of the Azores, in Strasbourg, by Antonio de Sousa; date not given]

[Text] "What would be the status of the Azores if a sum equivalent to what would now be \$20 million, or 1 million contos, had been invested in them annually over the past 30 years?" asks Mota Amaral, president of the Regional Government of the Azores, in an interview granted to DIARIO DE NOTICIAS.

This question implies a criticism of the Salazar government which, instead of trying to obtain economic compensation for the North American presence in the Azores, used the Lajes Base to obtain backing for its colonial policy.

The interview took place in Strasbourg, just after Mota Amaral had succeeded in obtaining recognition from the Council of Europe's Committee on Regional Problems and Territorial Regulation for the Azores as a geostrategic area of vital importance to Europe. In it, he analyzed, among other matters, the problems associated with autonomy and economic development, and the effects of Portugal's entry into the EEC on the Azores.

[Question] You submitted to the Committee on Regional Problems and Territorial Regulation, which convened on 26 and 27 June at the Council of Europe headquarters, a message regarding the status of the Atlantic island regions (the Azores, Madeira and the Canaries), and your report dealt particularly with the Azores. What was the committee's reaction to the report?

[Answer] The committee's reaction was extremely positive. Moreover, from the outset it appeared to me that this issue was treated very sympathetically by the members of the committee, perhaps because of the novelty and perhaps because of the exotic quality that the islands suggest. The fact is that, after a preliminary report was presented in January, the issue is now ready to be submitted to the plenary session of the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, which will meet this coming October, for consideration. I stress this fact because the topics dealt with by the conference

are usually continued for a longer time period. The committee received my observations with interest, and approved the general features of the conclusions in the final version of the report, so that it will be included, in a summarized form, in the draft resolution to be submitted to the plenary session of the conference.

[Question] What goals does the report stipulate, and what results do you expect to accrue?

[Answer] There are several goals: The first one is to publicize in the European "forum" which is best qualified in regional problems the Portuguese experience in this area, which may be regarded as quite advanced. This was the general feature of the observations made by the members of the committee during the discussion of the report. Secondly, it seems to me to be important to attract the attention of the Council of Europe to the problems of the European islands in the Atlantic; because both Portugal and Spain are in a phase of the process of joining the European Economic Community. Therefore, it is a good thing for European circles to be familiar with the specific problems of the islands, which are peripheral regions, and with the problems stemming from them, which have been exacerbated by their insular status. They are very small regions, and very weak from an economic standpoint, requiring very careful consideration, so that the integration will not leave the respective economic and social structures in jeopardy.

Another goal is that of paving the way for securing a special statute for the islands at the time of the entry of Portugal and Spain into the Common Market. Finally, one of the goals which inspired this initiative of mine was to convince the Europeans of Europe's stake in the Atlantic islands. And this matter is extremely important, both for the countries directly concerned and for Europe. Just last year, there were indications of an interest in the Atlantic islands on the part of other geostrategic areas. I am referring specifically to the statements made by certain African leaders concerning the need for the Organization of African Unity to follow the situation that exists in the Azores, Madeira and the Canaries, which could not have been isolated phenomena and which cannot be regarded as soothing.

It seems to me that Europe's interest should be aroused in that area of the Atlantic, which is also an interest in the respective populations; because the islands, with Madeira and the Canaries located in latitudes that are geographically African, which is not the case with the Azores, located in the latitude of Lisbon in Europe and New York in the United States, are by no means African islands, since the culture of the respective populations, their historical origin and their political and economic ties are European.

Now to discuss the results, it is my opinion that they have been attained. This is the overall quality of the conclusions in my report, which will be submitted this October, as I have said, at the Conference of the Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, and which also state that the archipelago of the Azores, Madeira and the Canaries constitutes a geostrategic area that

is vital to Europe. I think that it is very advantageous for these assertions to be contained in documents on the European level marked by prestige, as those of the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe undoubtedly are.

A Commitment to the Azores

[Question] In statements made recently to newsmen, you denied having the intention of assuming any positions on the executive level or in the leadership of the PSD [Social Democratic Party], giving as a reason your involvement in the development of the Azores. Does your decision still stand? What goals do you propose to attain for the Azores over the long and medium term?

[Answer] It still stands, it still stands! This is the issue: I have a commitment to this process of autonomy for the Azores, inasmuch as it is an idea that I have defended for a long time. Although it may not seem so, I have been engaged in political activity for 10 years, which is a long interval of activity in the present period of our political life. I have always felt that certain problems which reflected a step in the economic development of the Azores were converted into a series of negative, and even depressing factors. The most prominent was the rate of emigration which, over a period of 25 years, has caused over 60 percent of the present population to leave the Azores: in other words, 150,000 people, out of a population of approximately 250,000. A complete exodus! Now then, the idea that I defended was that the political parameters of our situation, which were erroneous, must be changed; that we must have institutional and financial means of coping with the problems of our development, which involves many individual features owing to our insular status. Hence the investigations which were carried out even prior to 25 April, but which were blocked by the regime then in power; hence the battle waged after 25 April, so that the Azores, and Madeira as well, would be guaranteed full autonomy, which would not be merely administrative autonomy for dealing with roads and public waterworks, but which would offer opportunities for solving the problems of the Azores in accordance with the wishes of the Azoreans and through the organs created under their jurisdiction. This goal has been attained. We have a statute of political and administrative autonomy which is not deficient in a comparison with Europe; on the contrary. We invite comparison with any of the statutes of regional autonomy that exist in Europe. This is a statute based on a democratic mandate which has at its disposal powers which, despite the fact that we are in a period of establishment and of problems stemming from transition, make it possible to cope with the tasks of economic development. And, in addition, there are financial facilities: the statute on the financial means that have been acquired, and the international projection itself which is guaranteed to the region by the constitution. All of this has given the Azores a statute for which I am partly responsible. I feel responsible for proving that it is possible to make this system work on completely democratic terms which will foster economic development and the reform of the structures of the society themselves. I feel responsible for this experiment, which I consider inviting, from which it is already possible to

observe results, and which, for that very reason, is far more attractive from a personal standpoint. Furthermore, this commitment of mine relates to a mandate which was received, since the party, for which I have associative leadership responsibilities in the Azores, has the confidence of the majority of the population. It also seems to me that people render public service, or at least they should be rendering it, through their civic activity; but this is not a service that should last an entire lifetime. Each individual has a responsibility for contributing his share to the good of society; but, at a certain juncture, he can and should pursue another path to his personal fulfillment, which may even entail dissociation from politics.

To Stanch the Hemorrhage of Emigration

[Question] Do you mean that you are counting on the return of the 150,000 emigrants?

[Answer] By no means! This is obviously not the goal being sought by the regional institutions of the Azores. We have a perfectly defined notion of the possibilities for the future development of the Azores, and it is obvious that the mass-scale return of the emigrants would turn into a tragic problem, inasmuch as it would make it necessary to divide our gross product, which is not very large, by over 150,000 persons; and this would reduce it to levels of production which would be quite intolerable. But I consider it important to stanch the hemorrhage; indeed I think it is vital, by creating decent living conditions that would enable people to fulfill themselves in their own country. An extraordinary effort must be made in this direction. It is true that the images motivating a large part of Azorean society are images imported from America; many people have relatives there, and many people went there. There is a very close relationship between our communities. Obviously, they took our traditional values to America, but the emigrant communities are wielding a strong influence with the habits and customs assumed in America.

Along this line, we cannot compete with the standard of living that has been provided the emigrants in the United States. Our goal is to create the conditions that will enable individuals to continue living in their own country. A very sizable effort is being expended to the point where, in 1978, it was found that the number of emigrants declined to half those recorded during the 1970's. Between 1970 and 1975, the number of emigrants was about 10,000 per year. At present, it is less than 5,000 each year. In fact, there has been a certain amount of effort which has caused a change in our traditional status as exporters of labor. Right now, we are importing labor. We have people working in the Azores, and not only highly skilled cadres. We have people working in administration, and on the staffs of business firms, which are one of the basic sectors in the economic and overall development of the Azores; but skilled labor is also coming from the continent.

[Question] Can it be concluded from your previous response that you accept the possibility of giving up politics?

[Answer] That question has just one answer, which is "yes." As I told you, politics is so wearing that I don't think anyone can engage in it for long, particularly a person who has certain standards and certain goals related to personal fulfillment. He must surely rest at some stage. I am not saying that I am tired! I have been in the fray for only 10 years; but it is only natural for me to become tired and, under those conditions, one has to know the right time to leave.

Economic "Boom" in View

[Question] There are some who claim that there is a prospect of an economic "boom" for the Azores during the next 5 years. What would cause such a "boom" to be triggered?

[Answer] The conditions that will trigger that "boom" are political, administrative and social stability; the continuation of the effort for investment which will be made and directed toward the basic infrastructures. Unless we have convenient communications facilities in the Azores, development will be impossible. This effort is one of the guidelines for the regional government's action; and, simultaneously with this, there is an impetus and a stimulus for private enterprise, directed mainly toward the industrial sector, the modernization of the agricultural sector and the fishing and tourism sectors as well.

We are striving with the viewpoint that our development should be achieved so as to allow for more complete human fulfillment, and not merely the triggering of the economic forces which, through mechanisms associated with the madness of consumption, only serve to destroy the human being. In the standards for our activity there is an expression of real interest in environmental protection through ecological balance, which has given us certain guidelines, namely, the elements of tourism, so that the fundamental essence of our island society will not be damaged.

[Question] When Dr Mota Amaral speaks of an investment effort, is he taking production into consideration? How does he explain the fact that the Azores which, until now, have been a poor region, are suddenly appearing with the prospect of an economic "boom"?

[Answer] This is a pertinent remark. We have an annual investment program contained in our budget, which is set up as a general state budget, making it possible to channel to the region funds that have been provided to us in terms of national solidarity. In other words, the relations between the Azores and the continent have changed substantially. From a period in which two thirds of the fiscal revenue collected in the Azores was sent to the continent, which was the situation that prevailed before 25 April, while, prior to 25 April, only a third of the fiscal revenue collected in the Azores had been allocated for the local administration then existing, we have moved to a different one, which assigns to the archipelago all the fiscal revenue

collected in it. Hence, the state has stopped being a means of suctioning public funds from the region and, in addition, it has asserted to the nation as a whole the needs and shortages existing in the archipelago; so that, through methods involving budgetary compensation, the many investments which should have been made for generations and which were not will be carried out within the next few years.

These resources, which will begin to be contributed by the profit coming from Lajes and the negotiations to be held on the use of fishing rights in the Exclusive Economic Zone, are also due to be channeled to the Azores. In this regard, I think that it behooves us to consider the fact that we in the Azores could be in a situation quite different from the current one, if it were not for certain types of political orientation which turned out to be clearly detrimental to the archipelago. For example, the orientation that was pursued (by the Salazar regime) of not attempting to obtain any economic compensation for the Azores for the North American presence in the islands, but, on the contrary, trying to secure a political compensation that would insure the development of its colonial policy. Now, let us ask this question:

What would be the status of the Azores if a sum equivalent to what would now be \$20 million, or 1 million contos, had been invested in them annually over the past 30 years?

I am certain that all the infrastructural problems now confronting us would have been solved, and that we would, therefore, be in a substantially different situation. It is this kind of justice that must be rendered to the islands, particularly since it is a fact that they have a significance and carry a weight in our nation as a whole that is considerable. This also justifies, from a policy standpoint, the adjustments of a financial and economic nature which have been made in the scope and implementation of the constitution itself.

Repercussions in the Azores From Entry Into the EEC

[Question] As you mentioned a short while ago, the conclusions approved by the Committee on Regional Problems and Territorial Regulation contain prominent recognition of the geostrategic importance of the Azores. Does the regional government intend to take advantage of this fact to obtain better terms in future negotiations on the Lajes Base?

[Answer] I think that we should uphold our values, and try to direct them to our development. In my opinion, it is illusory to consider neutralizing the Azores. Because of their geographical position, the Azores play a decisive role in the geostrategic balance of the North Atlantic. However, if they are not linked with one side, they will be taken by the other. I am referring to the two blocs in confrontation. As Napoleon said, the politics of a country lies in its geography. Since the geographical factor has entailed so many risks and so many potential obstacles for us, it is quite feasible for us to take every possible advantage that we can from it.

[Question] It has been reported that the regional government is expending efforts to obtain and channel to the Azores the investments of emigrants. Is it true?

[Answer] I would say that the regional government is interested in this kind of channeling. I would not say that it is making an effort because, apart from some informal personal contacts, we do not have an organized institutional facility for proceeding to obtain such investments. Under the aegis of the laws recently passed on companies and investment, we are thinking of creating a regional development company in the near future which could eventually operate in this area. Moreover, the Bank of Sao Miguel recently gave authorization for opening a branch in North America. One of its goals, and ours, is to open an office in Fall River and another in Toronto. So, when these institutional facilities are in operation, it can be claimed that we are engaged in this endeavor.

[Question] Another question still related to the economy of the Azores: In view of the fact that there are agricultural surpluses in the EEC countries, and the production in the Azores is essentially agricultural, what repercussions would Portugal's possible entry into the EEC have on the archipelago?

[Answer] These are problems which we must consider very carefully, and which may be viewed from a pessimistic or an optimistic standpoint. I prefer to view them realistically. They actually entail problems for the Azores, because the management of the "stocks" and surpluses of products derived from livestock raising constitute a great burden for the Community, which it is bearing at present, but which it may cease to bear over the long or medium term. Mechanisms must be created which will make it possible to eliminate these "stocks." Furthermore, the Community has quality standards that are very demanding, with certain criteria for prices. At the present time, we are attempting to take the European prices into account when we set the local prices for agricultural-livestock products. The great danger is that the European products, when complete freedom of circulation within the country is guaranteed, may start competing on intolerable terms, and we shall be hit not only in our traditional market on the continent but even in the islands, as the cheese, butter and other products appear there at cheaper prices than those for which we are capable of producing. All these problems have been weighed by us and, as may be noted from the comparison of the various arguments, at the present time there is no clearcut line on the matter, which will be studied and which requires deep consideration. Despite the fact that there are surplus "stocks," the Community guarantees the prices to the farmers and, with that measure, it might even be claimed that it would be comfortable for us to join the Common Market, which would guarantee the sale of our products at prices which would be acceptable. Furthermore, we should not forget that the maximum volume of our surpluses is only a drop in the bucket when compared with the overall problem of surpluses in the Community.

[Question] Then could it be said that, in this area, the regional government does not deem it necessary to negotiate special terms with the EEC?

[Answer] I only said that there are different problems, and that consideration will be given to what the essential line will be, one which has not been decided upon at present! This is a matter to which we have been alerted, and we are trying to call the attention of the national entities to the possible need, in view of the small dimensions and limited span of options available to the Azorean economy, for guaranteeing a special statute for the Azores in connection with our country's entry into the EEC.

[Question] Still with respect to Portugal's entry into the Common Market, what will happen to the Exclusive Economic Zone?

[Answer] The Exclusive Economic Zone is an extremely sensitive matter. It is one of the problems that have been most carefully studied, because the principle is as follows: the Community is the one administering the waters of the member nations. Therefore, the waters of the member nations are community waters, and the member nations have access to them under the same circumstances as the riparian country. Moreover, in negotiations with third parties, it is the Community itself which intervenes. Such a situation could turn out to be completely detrimental to the interests of the Azores, particularly with the prospect of development, which is not a reality at present. With a prospect of development, the fishing sector could become one of the fundamental sectors in the development of the Azores, which has not been exploited and which could grow. By the same token, it is also true that, in the area of the Community, the stringency of the application of these regulations has gradually been yielding to situations that are more understanding of the interests of the riparian nations, particularly when the traditional rights of essentially fishing populations are at stake. This could be an indication that, from an Azorean and national economic standpoint, an attempt should be made to guarantee a special statute for the Azores, similar to the one which was negotiated by Denmark for the Faeroes Islands archipelago.

[Question] I think that at one time there was someone who called for the conversion of the Azores into a federal state, claiming that this would protect its maritime zone....

[Answer] I never called for the conversion of the Azores into a federated state. That is a position held by the local CDS. At the time when this subject was discussed, my comment was that we were far less concerned about form than content, and that regional autonomy could include powers of benefit to the region, for the affirmation of its identity and development which would be more extensive than those stemming from the abstract implementation of the formula of the federal state.

From FLA [Azorean Liberation Front] to a Change of Views

[Question] In 1978, at the time of the SATA [Azorean Air Transport Company] strike, the regional government issued a communique in which it alerted the population to the danger of an armed coup, which was reportedly being planned. Would you describe what happened then?

[Answer] A short while later, speaking on radio and television, I explained what had occurred. The government learned that a conspiracy was afoot, aimed at a unilateral declaration of independence which would be associated with an overthrow of the democratic institutions that existed in the Azores. Obviously, like any responsible democratic government, it had to put up strong opposition, using all the means within its reach, against this destabilizing attempt, which was moreover doomed to defeat and presumably would cause a great deal of bloodshed.

[Question] Recently, a weekly publication stated that all the members of the government had been contacted by Jose de Almeida to back the revolt....

[Answer] That is not true.

[Question] However, your position with regard to the future of the Azores underwent a change after 1975. Jose de Almeida himself made a public statement after the regional government's communique was issued, disclosing that he had the backing of Dr Mota Amaral, who was even claimed to have collaborated in the FLA's program. What truth was there in Jose de Almeida's remarks? Did circumstantial reasons prompt you to change your views concerning the future of the archipelago?

[Answer] The situation in 1975 assumed such peculiar features in the Azores and Portugal that, to some extent, they have remained. At that time, Portugal was undergoing a period of political domination by the Communist Party, more or less masked, though slightly, and repudiated by the people all over the country and in the Azores as well, and viewed with great apprehension by the countries traditionally allied with Portugal, which may be included among the countries that have established a certain number of principles and values which are predominant in the Azores. This situation has changed substantially. I think that the way in which the population of the Azores reacted contributed to the final defeat of Goncalvism and, in particular, to eliminating any possibility of a seizure of power in Portugal by the Communists through a coup; since, through democratic procedures, that hypothesis is completely precluded under any circumstances and in any country. So, on these terms, the reasonable political situation is the political situation which has been established and mandated democratically, and which offers prospects for the progress of the Azores. But there is something else: Throughout recent years it was possible to follow what was happening in the outside world, and to prove that our efforts for the development and affirmation of the Azores were backed by capable resources that were more effective than those which seem to be at the disposal of areas, regions and

even countries with conditions relatively comparable to ours. Our "set-up" is better, and has greater facilities for stability. It has at its disposal more suitable resources, which are geared to the most profound interests of the Azorean people; and, in particular, it is the one which was chosen and mandated by them, and it is along that path that we must continue.

Opening for the PC [Communist Party] and Separatist Movements

[Question] Could it be claimed that there has been a change in your positions?

[Answer] Yes, as part of a logic and coherence in the principles themselves. The circumstances in 1975 were in such a state of upheaval that they could have led to the consideration of solutions which, under normal conditions, would not have been suitable. When the solutions now implemented were put to the test, it was proven that, in fact, there are obvious possibilities of our reaching a satisfactory conclusion through this course of action.

[Question] Is it in the context that you have just mentioned that Dr Mota Amaral appeared in public to defend an opening not only for the PC, but also for the separatist movements?

[Answer] This is true. I think that, in a situation marked by democratic normality, all views should be heard. It is essential that the democratic system show sufficient strength to include within its mechanisms all the persuasions which uphold democracy, of course. Therefore, this excludes the clandestine activity and coup activity of the Communist Party, as well as of the separatist movements. I consider it necessary in the Azores for all Azoreans to be able to live in peace and with complete security, regardless of their opinions and proposals regarding the future of the Azores and the structure of the society. After all, this situation, which the existing stability can guarantee, is, over the medium and long term, a guarantee for the political stability of the Azores. We do not have anything to gain by ignoring the fact that there is a trend of opinion which defends independence. This movement must devise its plan and prove its coherence; and it must be subjected to the judgment of the electorate. The same thing holds true for the Communist Party and other political movements, which must appear in all clarity and with an uncovered face before the electorate. If we do not take this path, we shall be spreading the seed of destabilization in the Azores, which may be attempted at first by movements with a conservative orientation, but which would be immediately taken up by the destabilizing movements associated with the international communist movement and the strategic interests of the Soviet Union, which would rout the other clandestine organizations and channel the issue of the Azores to the area in which problems of other Portuguese territories have been dealt with.

I have remarked on constant occasions that constitutional autonomy is the Portuguese solution, because there are solutions which are not Portuguese; for example, the integration in America or the independence of the Azores

in the Third World area, which has been upheld by some separatists. The proposal that we have is the one most consistent with the reality and the historic formation of the Azores. It is a Portuguese, European, Western solution. We all gain from this solution: the country and the Azores. I have no doubt that, if the Azores were to be attracted to certain orbits, they would become independent, but in a situation contrary to the interests of Azoreans. They would be independent under the same system that has been applied to all the independences proclaimed since 1960, dictated by Soviet interests and carried out by liberation parties and movements inspired by those same tendencies.

2909

CSO: 3101

COMMENTARY SCORES BASQUE STATUTE FOR INACCURATE LANGUAGE

Madrid ABC in Spanish 22 Jul 79 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Davila y Garcia-Miranda]

[Text] In general, the nationwide reaction to the agreement on the Basque Country Autonomy Statute successfully concluded between the government party and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) has been joyful. It seems as if, in one way or another, the history of Spain is being rewritten, with mistakes and emotional extremisms being stricken from it, after almost two centuries of isolation and divisiveness. What we are no doubt seeing is a democratic and liberal "honeymoon" between elements that seemed totally irreconcilable and that have now achieved a marriage of love or convenience. But not too long ago Camilo Jose Cela reminded us in this very paper that when a marriage fails, the bad part is almost always not the separation; "the bad part is the energy that the spouses waste in hating each other." He concluded by asserting that a marriage almost always fails "because of people's bad manners." Let us pray to God that the "marriage" between the UCD [Democratic Center Union] and the PNV does not break up on us for these reasons. Thus, let us all forget about saying things such as that, according to a Basque legislator, the actions and attacks of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] have in some way contributed to the success achieved (?). He added that neither is the statute "a good start for reinstituting the Basque way of life and for recovering the powers that we have been deprived of for many years." It represents precisely that recovery, more or less improvable, but part of a "here and now," not a dynamic process towards the disintegration of the state.

From another standpoint, Mr Roca Junyent, with whom I rarely agree, has criticized the document for its "conceptual inaccuracies," adding "that they seem dangerous to him." It is true, those inaccuracies are, in fact, serious and dangerous and ought to be rectified before final approval of the Basque statute. I have written previously in this same paper about the importance of "semantics" in the autonomy statutes and about the need for the strictest conceptual accuracy "so that biased and unconstitutional interpretations of their texts are neither possible nor feasible." Let us overlook the phrase, which leaves such a bitter

taste in our mouths, about the Basque people forming an autonomous community "as an expression of their nationality," because the constitution itself already contains this imprudent inaccuracy, but we are less pleased about the addition that it is designed for them "to accede to self-government," inasmuch as "self-government" can be regarded as a synonym of "self-determination," and the verb "to accede" implicitly carries the idea of "a path or process towards something." Wouldn't it be preferable to use "regulate" or "permit," which the dictionary considers synonyms of "to accede"?

In several of the new articles of the draft the previously utilized, purely geographic expression "Basque Country" has been replaced by the fairer and more accurate expression "Autonomous Community of the Basque Country." But the former term (which is, we repeat, totally inappropriate) is still used in the unamended articles and in some of the amended articles and points. More than once, the contrast is maintained between "the state," on the one hand, and the "Government of the Basque Country," on the other, when the latter, as an autonomous body of a unified state, is part and parcel "of the state." If one observes proper political and constitutional doctrine, one cannot say things such as that "the power to pardon, etc" (No 2 of Article 13) "belongs entirely to the state under the general laws," inasmuch as the proper wording is that these exclusive powers belong to the central government of the state or, if you wish, to its general administration; or that in the field of education "the powers vested in the state under Article 49, 1, 30 of the constitution and the high-level supervisory powers needed to comply with and guarantee it" are upheld, inasmuch as, we repeat, the autonomous community is also "the state," which can operate through its centralized bodies or through its autonomous bodies. Therefore, what Article 16 of the draft statute should really state is simply that such and such powers are reserved for the central government, or the state government, or the general administration of the state. Surprisingly enough, this is what has been done, and quite properly, in Article 13, 1, which clearly utilizes the expression "government," although it would not be superfluous to specify further by adding "of the state" or "central," because the supreme autonomous body is also a "government." Point 2 of Article 14 speaks of possible conflicts of competence and jurisdiction "between the judicial bodies of the Basque Country (the wording ought to be "of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country") and the other bodies of the state." It is said, because the jurisdictional bodies of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country are also bodies of the state.

Such insistence might seem unnecessary, but the terminological accuracy of the legal texts is important and essential in averting problems and disputes. And just as the adjective "general" has been added to the noun "Corries" at several places in the draft, what would be the drawback in clarifying and polishing the aforementioned expressions? It is not said to simply say "Basque Country," nor to contrast its bodies with the

state; instead, we should say "Autonomous Community of the Basque Country" and contrast its institutions with the general institutions of the state, the government and the central administration. This is what constitutional law and political doctrine tell us; anything else is lack of culture, temerity or bad faith.

Finally, why not include at times in the statute the beautiful, fruitful and enriching word "Spain"? It is not enough to say in passing, and almost shamefacedly, "Spanish state." This deliberate omission distresses us, and we are sure that it distresses the great majority of Basques, because like other Spaniards, they know that Spain is nothing more than the sum of its peoples and lands, united over more than 2,000 years of a beautiful adventure, for better and for worse, with heroism and cowardice, with grief and with glory.

8743

CSO: 3110

CANARY ARCHIPELAGO LEADER ON PROGRESS TOWARDS AUTONOMY

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 17 Jul 79 p 18

[Interview with Fernando Bergasa, the president of the Canary Islands Board, by Diego Talavera; date and place not given]

[Text] Fernando Bergasa, a 40-year old UCD [Democratic Center Union] deputy and a roads, canals and ports engineer, is the new president of the Canary Islands Board. A very active figure in the waning years of the Franco dictatorship, Bergasa founded, along with Manuel Bermejo, who today is mayor of Las Palmas representing the nationalist coalition called the Union of the Canarian People, the Autonomous Socialist Party of the Canary Islands, a political group that defined itself as Marxist. He later left it to join the Canarian Union, Lorenzo Olarte Cullen's party, of which he became and served as secretary general until it gave way to the Canarian UCD. He was elected deputy on 15 June 1977 and appointed director general of regions by the former minister for regions, Manuel Clavero. At the recent legislative elections he was reelected deputy representing the province of Las Palmas.

Fernando Bergasa has a difficult task in front of him at the head of the Canary Islands Board: nothing less than starting up an institution that the Canarian people feel cheated by on account of the record that it compiled during its initial phase. The UCD internal struggles on the islands (between the conservative-liberal and social democratic sectors) made the pre-autonomy entity, in which the government party is in the majority, an organization without direction, without the moral weight to fill the space that belonged to it and without the credibility to confront the future of the Canary Islands. Now that

these internal crises have been overcome, at least on the surface, Bergasa takes over as president with the support of the Las Palmas and Tenerife UCD at a crucial time in the history of the archipelago. This is because, aside from the structural problems of this "Atlantic people" (a crisis in agriculture, high unemployment, illiteracy, a shattered fishing sector, etc), the Canarian people are facing an identity crisis as never before in their five centuries of existence: "What are we, what do we want and where are we going?" Therefore, the board's new stage could play an important role in the future of the islands, and the results of its efforts are going to determine, to a greater or lesser extent, whether the Canarian people acquire faith in their own institutions in order to set out on a new road.

[Question] Does the current reorganization of the board mean that the UCD in the Canary Islands has resolved all of the ideological and power struggles between the Las Palmas and Tenerife provincial committees that caused the shutdown of the pre-autonomy entity during its initial phase?

[Answer] The Canarian UCD is a united party that is solidly established in the islands, as our electoral results show. In any case, we must not forget that the UCD is not a dogmatic party and that it represents a wide social spectrum, and thus it is entirely natural for this fact to manifest itself at times in slightly different positions within the party.

[Question] In the wake of the regrettable political spectacle in the board during its initial phase, how is the pre-autonomy entity going to be set in motion during the new stage?

[Answer] Well, I think that the board is already in motion and engaged in a specific work program that was announced this past 9 June, the day of its reorganization, in the speech that I delivered at the time. I said on that occasion that because of their paramount importance and their complexity, the objectives that we have to achieve require a serious and rigorous approach. The necessary transfers of functions and services from the state administration, the basic studies for the formulation of an economic program for the archipelago and the autonomy process are immediate issues of paramount importance that have to be broached with the utmost rigor and depth.

[Question] Let's talk about the Canarian Statute. How far can it go? Will the Canary Islands be able to count on enough organized bodies to make the people confident and secure about the future again?

[Answer] The answer is a very definite one: the Canarian people want to have a Legislative Assembly, a Council of Government and a Supreme Court of Justice. In this regard, Canarian city halls have taken the autonomy-related initiative provided for in the constitution, and they have all gone on record with the same views. The board wants the broadest and most effective autonomy for the Canary Islands.

[Question] In the event that the statute does not satisfy Canarian society and if, moreover, the nationalists feel cheated by the parliamentary method, don't you think that the most radical sectors could again opt for violence, either under the control of the Sovereignty and Independence Movement of the Canary Islands or any other group advocating independence that might arise in the archipelago?

[Answer] I do not see a coherent approach in the electoral conglomerate called the Union of the Canarian People, aside from certain rather vague and simplistic positions, which is to be expected given the diversity of the political groups that make it up. As far as the future is concerned, although in principle it can never be predicted, I think that, depending to a great extent on what we do today, we will be able to rationalize our situation, see the alternatives that we have and with hard work meet the challenges relating to solidarity and unity with the rest of the country. Moreover, I can tell you that I am concerned more about the violence that could be generated by the frustration and despair of a people like the Canarian people, who are currently feeling the weight of extremely serious problems, than by the other sort of violence that arises from sectarianism, dogmatism and irrational ideological intransigence.

"We Are in Favor of Military Bases on the Islands"

[Question] There can be no doubt that politically and economically the Canary Islands cannot turn their back on the African continent. What is the board's position going to be on this issue? Is it going to name a foreign affairs adviser in the Canarian government, taking into account the numerous problems of all sorts that are going to crop up with the countries of Africa?

[Answer] The policy of the Canary Islands towards the neighboring peoples of Africa must be based on relations of cooperation and respect. Now then, foreign relations are the exclusive responsibility of the state and, therefore, are not going to involve any transfers to pre-autonomous or autonomous entities. On the other hand, we must not forget that we are in touch with the government to explain to it all of our viewpoints regarding the issues that affect us. Thus, for example, a commission has been set up with the Ministry for Relations with the EEC to study the impact of Spain's membership in the Common Market on the Canary Islands so that our needs and views are taken into account.

[Question] Lastly, what is your opinion regarding the possible establishment of foreign bases in the Canary Islands? Do you think that the islands ought to remain neutral militarily?

[Answer] Politically speaking, and as president of the board, I have to voice the opinion of the entity, in which the UCD is in the majority. Our Armed Forces have always maintained a presence in the Canary Islands, and of course we are not neutral as far as Spain's defense is concerned. We are an integral part of the country and, like all Spaniards, we must contribute to its defense. As a result, we are in favor of an active and effective presence for our Armed Forces in the islands.

8743

CSO: 3110

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

28 AUG 79

WB

